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[W]here the market has very limited purchasing power, as is the case for
diseases affecting millions of poor people in developing countries, patents
are not a relevant factor or effective in stimulating [Research and
Development] and bringing new products to market.2

I. INTRODUCTION
The debate surrounding the creation of a balanced patent
protection regime in countries is not new. For decades, policy makers
experimented with the levels of protection.3 For example, the
Netherlands abolished patents in the field of chemistry for decades
between 1869 and 1910, in order to catch up with other European
countries such as Germany.4 Similarly, between 1960 and 1980 a
number of Asian economies—often referred to as the Tiger
economies—adopted a systematic national policy of reverse
engineering and imitation.5 When South Korea introduced patent
protection in 1961, the protection term was limited to only twelve
years and protection did not extend to foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals, or

2. WORLD HEALTH ORG., PUBLIC HEALTH INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS, INNOVATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH 22 (2006) [hereinafter WHO, PUBLIC
HEALTH INNOVATION].
3. On the history of the weak regime for intellectual property protection in
the United States, see Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in the TwentyFirst Century: Will the Developing Countries Lead or Follow?, 46 HOUS. L. REV.
1115, 1116-18, 1120 (2009).
4. ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS:
HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND
PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 86-90 (2004).
5. See COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 20 (2002) (finding
that East Asian countries, Taiwan and South Korea in particular, imposed weak
patent systems to expand technical knowledge and foster rapid economic
development).
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chemicals.6 Similarly, many of the developed nations adopted a
relaxed protection regime during their initial stages of development,
utilizing their preferred intellectual property regime only after
reaching a certain level of advancement.7
This debate remains as relevant as ever.8 A 2013 report published
in Australia sums up the dilemma facing many governments in the
area of public health, noting:
Thus the question of how much patent protection to offer is crucial.
Pharmaceutical patent rights that run for too long or that are defined too
expansively will deprive people of drugs because purchasers, including
Governments, cannot afford them. They can also constrain follow on
innovation: too weak a patent system means patients will suffer because
the industry has inadequate incentives to develop new drugs.9

On March 31, 2015, the Harper Report, triggered by major
concerns about the current regime, requested that the Australian
government should direct the Productivity Commission to conduct a
twelve-month overarching review of the intellectual property regime
in the country.10
6. See id. at 19-20 (conveying the prevalent belief at the time that states had
to restrict patents on “essential goods” such as food, medicine, and basic
chemicals; the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
prohibits such discriminatory policies today).
7. See CTR. FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES & DEBATES, BRAZIL’S PATENT REFORM
INNOVATION TOWARDS NATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS 224, 225 (2013) (citing HaJoon Chang who implied that many developed countries mistakenly believe that
stronger intellectual property protection led to their economic growth).
8. There has been a number of reports in recent years of this type including a
report by the Government of the United Kingdom. See COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL
PROP. RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 155 (weighing arguments for and against stronger
intellectual property rights and deciding that intellectual property rights should be
customized to meet the economic and social needs of the developing country in
question); see also GOWERS REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 59 (2006)
(finding that flexibility to choose the strength of intellectual rights is necessary for
developing countries).
9. TONY HARRIS ET AL., PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS REVIEW REPORT v
(2013).
10. IAN HARPER ET AL., COMPETITION POLICY REVIEW FINAL REPORT 41
(2015); cf. GOWERS REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 8, at 1
(stating that the United Kingdom commissioned a similar report examining
whether its intellectual property regime was meeting its “purpose in an era of
globalisation, digitisation, and increasing economic specialisation”).
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Many factors affect the intellectual property regime in any
country.11 This also means that the responsiveness of intellectual
property protection itself to any reform will vary depending on these
factors. Therefore, it is baseless to advocate that stronger economic
growth in any given country would be triggered by strengthened
intellectual property protection.12 The World Bank, in a 2005 report,
concluded that “[e]vidence is inconclusive about the responsiveness
of Foreign Direct Investment (“FDI”) to intellectual property
regimes.”13
Home grown factors, including a country’s level of development
and progress, its national priorities, and standards of living are often
important factors in shaping the debate. Yet in more recent times,
external factors became more visible—and even more influential to
that effect—in the formation of such a process. Following the
creation of the World Trade Organisation (“WTO”) and its
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(“TRIPS Agreement”) in 1994, an upward trend in the regulation and
enforcement of intellectual property rights in general was
noticeable.14 More recently, TRIPS-Plus rules were included under
various bilateral, regional, and multilateral arrangements and forums
resulting in strengthened levels of intellectual property protection
and enforcement in many parts of the world.15
11. See Carlos Correa, Designing Patent Policies Suited to Developing
Countries Needs, 10 ECONÔMICA, RIO DE JANEIRO 82, 87 (2008) (discussing,
among other things, growing limitations on a developing country’s ability to shape
their patent system because of TRIPS-Plus provisions in Free Trade Agreements
such as expanding patents to protect “the second indication of existing
medicines”).
12. See generally Fritz Malchup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in
the Nineteenth Century, 10 J. ECON. HIST. 1 (1950) (presenting how the nineteenth
century arguments for and against patent protections remained unchanged despite
economic changes during that time period).
13. WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS: TRADE, REGIONALISM,
AND DEVELOPMENT 110 (2005).
14. See Ruth L. Okediji, Legal Innovation in International Intellectual
Property Relations: Revisiting Twenty-One Years of the TRIPS Agreement, 36 U.
PA. J. INT’L L. 191, 205 (2014) (“Certainly, the TRIPS Agreement has not
produced the normative stability many imagined, desired or feared.”).
15. Wadhwa recently explained the developments and change of approach in
following manner:
The framers of the U.S. Constitution were not wrong. Patents did serve an important
purpose during the days when technology advances happened over decades or
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More crucial than any other branch of intellectual property in
today’s global debate is the issue of patent protection and its relation
to the accessibility and affordability of medicines. The TRIPS
Agreement made it obligatory for the first time in history for all
member states to provide patent protection for pharmaceutical
products and processes.16 This meant that many developing—and
developed—countries are no longer capable of making drugs cheaper
and affordable for their citizens, due to the need to pay royalties to
the pharmaceutical producers originating from the developed
countries.17 With the support of the major pharmaceutical producers,
these developed countries incorporated the protection of intellectual
property in their international trade agenda under the auspices of free
trade, resulting in, and subjecting developing countries into
accepting, higher TRIPS-Plus levels of intellectual property
protection under their national legal regimes.18

centuries. In today’s era of exponentially advancing technologies, however, patents
have become the greatest inhibitor to innovation and are holding the United States
back. The only way of staying ahead is to out-innovate a competitor; speed to market
and constant reinvention are critical. Patents do the reverse; they create disincentives
to innovate and slow down innovators by allowing technology laggards and
extortionists to sue them.

Vivek Wadhwa, Here’s Why Patents are Innovation’s Worst Enemy, WASH. POST
(Mar. 11, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2015/
03/11/heres-why-patents-are-innovations-worst-enemy/.
16. Essential Medicines and Health Products, WTO and the TRIPS Agreement,
WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/wto_trips/en/#
(last visited Jan. 26, 2016).
17. See John H. Barton, TRIPS and the Global Pharmaceutical Market, 23
HEALTH AFF., May-June 2004, at 146, 146-48 (noting that India possessed an
established industry in generic drugs that became threatened by the patent
provisions in the TRIPS Agreement).
18. See CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT AND THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REFORM IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 13 (2008) (“Over a third of the WTO’s 106 developing
country members included a broad range of TRIPS-plus provisions in their laws.
Over half of the countries in this TRIPS-plus group were [least developed
countries]—the same countries that the economic literature anticipates would
adopt the lowest levels of IP protection.”); Courtenay Atwell, Corporate
Involvement in Intellectual Property Policy-making, 36 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV.
306, 308 (2014) (examining the history of corporate involvement in intellectual
property protections in the United States in the years leading up to the TRIPS
Agreement).

378

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[31:3

Significantly, many countries—including developed ones—are no
longer able to cater and provide adequate public health care coverage
for their citizens due to the high costs of medicines. The situation is
worsened due to various austerity measures taken by many of these
countries.19
In the light of the above, this article will provide an overview of
the current global debate with relation to public health and access to
medicines and its relationship with patent policy. It will also touch
upon the flexibilities of the TRIPS Agreement and provide various
utilization examples where such flexibilities have resulted in a
positive impact on access to medicines and public health in both
developed and developing countries. Although there has been
extensive discussion in recent years focusing on the importance of
incorporating the TRIPS Agreement’s flexibilities under national
law, there has been little discussion about the options available to
those countries that have already committed themselves to TRIPSPlus obligations. Taking this into consideration, this article will
provide an overview of various examples whereby countries
managed to limit the negative impact of TRIPS-Plus rules under their
national legal regime through legal and institutional innovative
approaches. Finally, this article will also allude to the global debate
related to financing of public health care and will explore the
viability of one supplementary scheme which could complement the
patent protection regime in this regard, namely pay-for-performance
schemes.

II. PUBLIC HEALTH, PHARMACEUTICAL
INNOVATION, AND THE COMPETITIVENESS OF
THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
The global public health situation is facing many challenges today.
One third of the world’s population (over 2 billion people) does not
have regular access to basic, essential medicine.20 Of the 34 million
19. See, e.g., Helena Smith et al., Greek Economy Close to Collapse as Food
and
Medicine
Run
Short,
GUARDIAN
(July
3,
2015),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/03/greece-economy-collapse-closefood-medicine-shortage.
20. See Hans V. Hogerzeil & Zafar Mirza, WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO], THE
WORLD MEDICINES SITUATION 2011: ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES AS PART
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people estimated by the World Health Organization (“WHO”), the
Children’s Rights and Emergency Relief Organization, and the Joint
United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS to be living with the
human immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”) and who should have been
receiving treatment, only 8 million had access to treatment by the
end of 2011.21 As of June 2014, 13.6 million people living with HIV
had access to antiretroviral therapy and 41% of all adults living with
HIV are receiving treatment.22 However, just 32% of all children
living with HIV are receiving the lifesaving medicines.23 The burden
of the “neglected disease” or “diseases of the poor” overcasts its
shadow over this situation leaving the world helpless in saving many
lives all over the globe.24
On the other hand, the pharmaceutical industry has been engulfed
with its own woes in recent years culminating in a number of
challenges. The first major challenge is the investment and research
(“R&D”) dilemma facing the industry. Drug producers are no
different than other investors in that their operations are motivated by
profits. The fact that their mission implies saving lives, does not
speak to whether this mission would be achieved at cost to these
companies and their shareholders.25 The first important element for
any pharmaceutical company’s decision to indulge in specific
experiments and clinical trials is market size and more importantly
the ability of that market size (i.e. patients) to be able to purchase the

OF THE RIGHT TO HEALTH 1 (2011).
21. UNAIDS, GLOBAL REPORT:
EPIDEMIC 8, 50 (2012).

UNAIDS REPORT ON THE GLOBAL AIDS

22. Fact Sheet 2015, UNAIDS (2015), http://www.unaids.org/en/resources/
campaigns/HowAIDSchangedeverything/factsheet.
23. Id.
24. See Getting to Zero AIDS-Related Deaths: TRIPS and the Potential Impact
of Free Trade Agreements, UNAIDS (June 1, 2012), http://www.unaids.org/en/
resources/presscentre/featurestories/2012/june/20120601tripsftas (explaining the
impact of TRIPS-Plus provisions on the dire circumstances of millions of people
on antiretroviral therapy).
25. Michael Pearson, the CEO of Valeant Pharmaceuticals stated recently that
“[i]f products are sort of mispriced and there’s an opportunity, we will act
appropriately in terms of doing what I assume our shareholders would like us to
do.” James Woods, Pharma CEO: We’re in Business of Shareholder Profit, Not
Helping the Sick, US Uncut (Oct. 9, 2015), http://usuncut.com/class-war/valeantceo-shareholder-profit/.
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drug at the asking price.26 Due to such externalities, this resulted in
the well-known equation; the ninety-ten gap. The Commission on
Health Research for Development explained in a 1990 report that
90% of the innovation in healthcare relates to the diseases of a mere
10% of the population of the world.27 This explains why the
pharmaceutical industry remains today as one of the most profitable
industries around the globe. Strikingly, in 2013, there were five
pharmaceutical companies which each made a profit margin of 20%
or more—Pfizer, Hoffmann-La Roche, AbbVie, GlaxoSmithKline,
and Eli Lilly.28 Avorn further explains:
In terms of access to capital, it’s interesting to note that large drug makers
are among the U.S. firms with the highest amounts of profits held
overseas. Two pharmaceutical companies are ranked third and fourth
among all U.S. corporations in this regard: Pfizer ($69 billion) and Merck
($57 billion), respectively. Collectively, another eight drug companies
reportedly have an additional $173 billion of capital that is retained
overseas, untaxed by the United States.29

Accordingly, multinational pharmaceutical companies are more
interested in how activities relate to certain types of diseases, i.e.
lifestyle diseases (including skin care and sexual dysfunctional
related disease) to that of neglected diseases (including malaria,
26. See Ernst R. Berndt et al., Decline in Economic Returns from New Drugs
Raises Questions About Sustaining Innovations, 34 HEALTH AFF. 245, 245 (2015)
(finding that pharmaceutical companies assessed whether their “life-time sales
[would] be sufficient to generate positive returns on investment beyond recouping
[research and development] and operating costs”).
27. COMM’N ON HEALTH RESEARCH FOR DEV., HEALTH RESEARCH:
ESSENTIAL LINK TO EQUITY IN DEVELOPMENT 4, 45 (1990); see SOPHIE BLOEMEN
ET AL., OXFAM, TRADING AWAY ACCESS TO MEDICINES—REVISITED: HOW THE
EUROPEAN TRADE AGENDA CONTINUES TO UNDERMINE ACCESS TO MEDICINES 8
(2014) (“The statistical finding that only 10 percent of the world’s R&D
expenditure for health is devoted to diseases that primarily affect the poorest 90
percent of the global population has become a symbol of the current R&D crisis.”).
28. Richard Anderson, Pharmaceutical Industry Gets High on Fat Profits,
BBC News (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-28212223
[hereinafter Anderson, Fat Profits] (“Last year, US giant Pfizer, the world’s largest
drug company by pharmaceutical revenue, made an eye-watering 42% profit
margin. As one industry veteran understandably says: ‘I wouldn’t be able to justify
[those kinds of margins].’”).
29. Jerry Avorn, The $2.6 Billion Pill – Methodologic and Policy
Considerations, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1877, 1878 (2015).
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tuberculosis, and even antibiotics).30 In fact, some studies indicate
that neglected diseases (even including type II diseases, such as
malaria and tuberculosis) receive a meagre 2% of the annual $160
billion spent globally on R&D.31 This example is quite similar to the
recent Ebola outbreak where no vaccination existed despite the fact
that the disease has been around for decades with more than thirty
outbreaks.32 One commentator recently described the full picture by
stating that “[o]ur priorities are tilted by marketplace imperatives.”33
In a widely circulated publication dating to 2002, Trouiller et al.
found that of all of the pharmaceutical products developed in the
world between 1975 and 1999, only 1.1% were related to neglected
diseases.34 Recently, the same study was repeated and the results

30. MATTHIAS BUENTE ET AL., BOOZ & CO., PHARMA EMERGING MARKETS
2.0: HOW EMERGING MARKETS ARE DRIVING THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 8 (2013) (finding that pharmaceutical executives
believe that “disease patterns in emerging markets are rapidly changing and
shifting toward ‘lifestyle’ diseases”). For instance, there have been no new
discoveries of distinct classes of antibacterials since 1987. Michael Torrice,
Antibacterial Boom and Bust, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, Sept. 9, 2013, at
34, 36. The lack of investment in research and development on the “diseases of the
poor” prompted the WHO to adopt the Global Strategy and Plan of Action on
Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property in 2008. WORLD HEALTH ORG.
[WHO], GLOBAL STRATEGY AND PLAN OF ACTION ON PUBLIC HEALTH,
INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2011).
31. Brian Till, How Drug Companies Keep Medicine Out of Reach, ATLANTIC
(May 15, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/05/how-drugcompanies-keep-medicine-out-of-reach/275853/.
32. See Abraar Karan & Thomas Pogge, Ebola and the Need for Restructuring
Pharmaceutical Incentives, 5 J. GLOBAL HEALTH 1, 1-2 (2015) (“Had there been
significant Ebola outbreaks in affluent nations rather than in Sub-Saharan Africa in
the past few decades, we would likely have an arsenal of medications in stock
today. While pharmaceutical companies continue to profit from sales of nonessential medicines, and neglect investments in medicines that are needed mainly
by the poor, the global community ends up paying as result.”).
33. Till, supra note 31 (quoting Bill Gates explaining that “[t]he malaria
vaccine, in humanist terms, is the biggest need, but it gets virtually no funding. If
you are working on male baldness or the other things you get an order of
magnitude more researching funding because of the voice in the marketplace”).
34. See Patrice Trouiller et al., Drug Development for Neglected Diseases: A
Deficient Market and a Public-Health Policy Failure, 359 LANCET 2188, 2188
(2002) (finding that sixteen out of 1,393 drugs marketed between 1975 and 1999
were for neglected diseases).
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only marginally changed.35 Of the 850 products brought to market
around the world between 2000 and 2011, the study found that only
4% (a mere thirty-seven) were related to neglected diseases, which
mainly exist in least and middle income countries and include
malaria, tuberculosis, Chagas’ disease, leishmaniasis, and diarrhoeal
diseases.36
A more in-depth analysis of the fields and areas where the R&D
activities are conducted also assists in explaining the selectiveness of
the industry. One study found that “[a]mong the 1223 new chemical
entities commercialized between 1975 to 1997, . . . only 13 (1%) are
specifically for tropical diseases. . . . and only 4 (0.3%) may be
considered direct results of R&D activities of the pharmaceutical
industry.”37 A more recent study found that pharmaceutical
companies conduct thirty times more clinical trials for recurrent
cancer drugs than for preventive drugs.38 The study showed that
pharmaceutical companies focus more on profitable recurring sales
through diverting their R&D expenditures away from more curable,
localized cancers and focus on incurable metastatic and recurrent
cancers instead.39 As the authors of the study explain, “the patent
system encourages pharmaceuticals to pump out drugs aimed at
35. See Miltos Ladikas & Sachin Chaturvedi, The Health Impact Fund, Issues
and Challenges, in THE LIVING TREE: TRADITIONAL MEDICINE AND PUBLIC
HEALTH IN CHINA AND INDIA 33, 33 (Sachin Chaturvedi et al. eds., 2014) (“Of the
1,556 new drugs approved for commercial sale from 1975-2004, only 18 (ca 1%)
were for neglected tropical diseases.”).
36. Germán Velásquez, Guidelines on Patentability and Access to Medicines 8
(South Ctr., Working Paper No. 61, 2015); see also Carlos Correa, Guidelines for
the Examination of Pharmaceutical Patents: Developing a Public Health
Perspective vii (Jan. 2007) (working paper) (on file with the World Health
Organization and International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development)
[hereinafter Correa, Guidelines] (suggesting that treatments to diseases such as
AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, bacterial meningitis, and pneumonia will require
ongoing research and development to combat increasing resistance to the existing
medicine).
37. Bernard Pécoul et al., Access to Essential Drugs in Poor Countries: A Lost
Battle?, 281 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 361, 364 (1999).
38. See Eric Budish et al., Do Firms Underinvest in Long-Term Research?
Evidence from Cancer Clinical Trials, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 2044, 2047 (2015)
(discovering that firms conducted 17,000 clinical trials for recurrent cancer
treatment versus less than 500 trials toward prevention).
39. A.T., Patents That Kill, ECONOMIST (Aug. 8, 2014, 9:50 AM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2014/08/innovation.

2016]

TRIPS-PLUS

383

those who have almost no chance of surviving the cancer anyway.
This patent distortion costs the U.S. economy around $89 billion a
year in lost lives.”40
Notably, the selectiveness in the development of new medicines
also applies to industrialised countries including the United States.
For instance, Zakir Thomas reminds us that “the United States is the
largest pharmaceutical market of the world. Even there, if you have a
disease which does not command a huge market which interests
pharmaceutical companies, you don’t have innovation.”41
The stagnation—which some would even argue the decline—in
the innovative and productive ability of pharmaceutical companies in
recent years is visible.42 The situation is also exacerbated by the
disequilibrium with relation to the breakdown of R&D activities and
the focus on the disease related to the minority citizens of the globe
who are rich enough to be able to cover the cost of their
medication.43 A 2006 U.S. Government Accountability Office report
stated:
[O]ver the past several years it has become widely recognized throughout
the industry that the productivity of its research and development
expenditures has been declining; that is, the number of new drugs being
produced has generally declined while research and development
expenses have been steadily increasing. Similarly, FDA and analysts
reported that pharmaceutical research and development investments were
not producing the expected results and that innovation in the
pharmaceutical industry had become stagnant.44

40. Id.
41. Zakir Thomas, The Limits of the Patent System Do Patents Kill
Innovation?, OPEN SOURCE DRUG DISCOVERY (Aug. 13, 2014),
http://osddbengaluru.net/osdd/?p=16504.
42. See Cynthia M. Ho, Should All Drugs Be Patentable?: A Comparative
Perspective, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 295, 300 (2015) (indicating that some
academics believe stronger patent protection is necessary to expand research and
development into innovating new drugs); see also Berndt et al., supra note 26, at
250-51 (asserting that protective intellectual property rights are meant to encourage
R&D, but evidence shows that new active substances are not producing a
significant economic return).
43. COMM’N ON MACROECONOMICS & HEALTH, MACROECONOMICS AND
HEALTH: INVESTING IN HEALTH FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 78 (2001).
44. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-49, NEW DRUG
DEVELOPMENT: SCIENCE, BUSINESS, REGULATORY, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
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More recently Kees de Joncheere stated that, “[t]he system has
served us well in terms of developing good new medicines, but in the
past 10-20 years there has been very little breakthrough in
innovation.”45 The situation is no different on the opposite side of the
Atlantic. In 2008, the European Commission reported a decrease in
new chemical entities registered between 1990 and 2007 (from fiftyone in 1991 to twenty-one in 2007).46
A look at available data would assist in explaining the above
further. On average and with the exception of the year 2014—when a
record forty-one new drugs were approved representing the highest
increase in eighteen years—a dramatic decline of newly-developed
chemical entities has been observed during the last fifteen years.47
This positions the industry uniquely as the range of its innovation
fluctuates between major “blockbuster” breakthroughs to minor
“trivial” improvements and new uses of available medicines.48
Unsurprisingly, it is within the latter category where the majority of
ISSUES CITED AS HAMPERING DRUG DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS 2 (2006). Moreover, a
PricewaterhouseCoopers report revealed that despite increased expenditures on
R&D, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration authorized a mere twenty-two new
molecular entities in 2006. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, PHARMA 2020: THE
VISION: WHICH PATH WILL YOU TAKE? 5 (2007).
45. Richard Anderson, Pharmaceuticals Industry Facing Fundamental
Change, BBC NEWS (Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/business29659537 [hereinafter Anderson, Pharmaceuticals].
46. EUR. COMM’N, PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR INQUIRY, FINAL REPORT 38
(2009) [hereinafter EUR. COMM’N, PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR INQUIRY].
47. Cambria Alpha-Cobb & Anthony D. Sabatelli, Guest Post: 41 New Drugs
Approved in ‘14 – A Random Spike or a Growing Trend of Drug Innovation?,
PATENT DOCS (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.patentdocs.org/2015/01/guest-post-41new-drugs-approved-in-14-a-random-spike-or-a-growing-trend-of-druginnovation.html; see Jeff Cohen et al., Strategic Alternatives in the Pharmaceutical
Industry 5 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Kellogg School of
Management) (“In fact, R&D productivity for the pharmaceutical industry has
declined considerably with the number of New Molecular Entities (NMEs)
submitted for approval dropping by nearly 50 percent, to about 40, and the number
of New Chemical Entities (NCEs) produced per company declining by 41
percent . . . .”).
48. See Cohen et al., supra note 47, at 8-10 (reflecting the dilemma
pharmaceutical companies face with the decline of innovative drugs. The companies
cannot rely on the substantial returns they generated from “blockbuster drugs” if they
want to appease their shareholders. Instead, they generate new sources of revenue by
making slight improvements to existing drugs).
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recent innovations—or more accurately improvements—have taken
place.49
The statistics referred to above, however, do not explain the full
story. The issue with the new entrant drugs into the market is that
they actually represent “minor” or “combinational” improvements
rather than breakthrough or substantial discoveries.50 Indeed, as
Youn et al. eloquently explains:
By definition, all patented inventions are ‘novel’, but not all novelty is
created equal. The novelty instantiated by patented inventions stems not
only from conceiving new technologies but also from combining
technologies, either new or old. The history of US patents reveals a slight
preponderance of technological combinations not previously seen in the
patent record. US patent law, however, allows for patents to be granted to
inventions that represent improvements over existing inventions.51

For example, a 2005 survey published in France found that 68% of
the 3096 new products approved in the country between 1981 and
2004 brought “nothing new” in comparison to previous
preparations.52 Another study concluded that almost half of the new
49. See id.; see also Carlos M. Correa, Pharmaceutical Innovation,
Incremental Patenting and Compulsory Licensing 5 (South Ctr., Research Paper
No. 41, 2011) [hereinafter Correa, Pharmaceutical Innovation] (“The fall in
innovative productivity may indicate a crisis in the model of drug development
carried out by large pharmaceutical companies, as ‘the number of new products
has not increased whilst the overall level of resources being invested has risen
dramatically.’”).
50. See Cohen et al., supra note 47, at 8-10; see also WHO, PUBLIC HEALTH
INNOVATION, supra note 2, at 131 (“[T]here are studies which find that many new
medicines offer little or no improvement over existing medicines. For instance, in a
recent Canadian study, the conclusion was that in British Columbia, 80% of the
increase in drug expenditure between 1996 and 2003 was explained by the use of
new, patented drugs that did not offer substantial improvements over less
expensive alternatives available before 1990.”).
51. Hyejin Youn et al., Invention as a Combinatorial Process: Evidence from
US Patents, J. ROYAL SOC. INTERFACE, no. 106, 2015, at 7. The Economist further
elaborates that “invention now proceeds mainly by recombining existing
technologies and chimes with the idea that inventions were, in some sense, more
fundamental in the past than they are today.” The Process of Invention, Now and
Then, ECONOMIST (Apr. 25, 2015), http://www.economist.com/node/21649448/
print.
52. A Review of New Drugs in 2004: Floundering Innovation and Increased
Risk-Taking, 14 PRESCRIRE INT’L 68, 71 (2005). See generally K.I. Kaitin & J.A.
DiMasi, Pharmaceutical Innovation in the 21st Century: New Drug Approvals in
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drugs approved for use during the 1990s in the United States did not
offer major or important clinical improvements.53 A Canadian study
of 1,147 newly patented drugs, including derivatives of existing
medicines between 1990 and 2003, revealed that 1005 of such drugs
did not provide a “substantial improvement over existing drug
products.”54 Although as mentioned, the year 2014 witnessed an
increase in the number of approved New Molecular Entities, it
remains to be an exception than the rule.55
Interestingly, accompanying the same trend was the substantial
increase in the number of granted pharmaceutical patents, which
represented mostly minor and simple improvements in chemistry/
formulation of existing pharmaceutical products (e.g. polymorphs,
combinations, dosage forms, isomers) or incremental modifications
of existing drugs (e.g. a different dosage or a different form of
administration).56 Correa explains that “[t]housands of patents are
granted per year on these incremental innovations, often trivial for a
person skilled in pharmaceutical research and production.”57 Such a
phenomenon is not confined to the United States. A 1994 Canadian
study found that 90% of all patented inventions were minor
improvements on existing patented devices.58 As Ho explains:
Accordingly, a rational profit-maximizing company would logically seek
to focus on incremental inventions. In fact, that is already the case. During
the 1990s more than half of applications for “new” drugs were
incremental innovations that utilized known active ingredients. In
addition, studies of pharmaceutical innovation in the United States,
Australia, and Europe all found most new drugs were incremental
innovations and that only between 10 and 30 percent of drugs were more
the First Decade, 2000–2009, 89 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 183
(2011).
53. MICHAEL BAILEY ET AL., POLICY DEP’T OF OXFAM, FATAL SIDE EFFECTS:
MEDICINE PATENTS UNDER THE MICROSCOPE 26 (2001).
54. Steven G Morgan et al., “Breakthrough” Drugs and Growth in
Expenditure on Prescription Drugs in Canada, 331 BMJ 815, 815 (2005).
55. Alpha-Cobb & Sabatelli, supra note 47.
56. Correa, Pharmaceutical Innovation, supra note 49, at 4; see also Ho, supra
note 42, at 311 (“Although an incremental modification may be of some clinical
benefit, these are notably easier and less expensive to develop; one estimate
suggests that the cost of development is only a quarter of the cost of the most
expensive drugs (based on new molecular entities).”).
57. Correa, Pharmaceutical Innovation, supra note 49, at 4.
58. Id. at 2 (citing the Guide of the Canadian Intellectual Property Office).
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therapeutically valuable than existing drugs.59

The prices of new medicines are also on the rise, making them out
of the reach of the majority of citizens even in developed countries.60
For instance, many new cancer treatments are biologic drugs priced
at more than $100,000 per year.61 Bristol-Myer’s new drug for
advanced melanoma, nivolumab (trade name Opdivo), can cost from
$2,500 to $3,700 per week, depending upon the patient weight. So
explains, “11 of the 12 cancer drugs approved in 2012 were priced
over US$100,000 per patient per year.”62 So concludes that among
the top 100 drugs in the United States, “the median revenue per
patient rose from US$1,258 in 2010 to US$9,396 in 2014.”63 A new
hepatitis C treatment (sofosbuvir, marketed as Sovaldi) recently
came onto the market at the high price of $84,000 for a twelve-week
treatment.64 This drug, when used in conjunction with another drug,
59. Ho, supra note 42, at 312; see also Michael Lanthier et al., An Improved
Approach to Measuring Drug Innovation Finds Steady Rates of First-In-Class
Pharmaceuticals, 1987-2011, 32 HEALTH AFF. 1433, 1435-36 (2013) (supporting
the view that the sudden increase in new drug approvals during the 1990s were not
a result of innovative new drugs, but of incremental innovations).
60. Jan Schakowsky & Peter Maybarduk, US Trade Policy Could Raise Drug
Prices, at Home and Abroad, HILL (Mar. 6, 2015), http://thehill.com/opinion/oped/234801-us-trade-policy-could-raise-drug-prices-at-home-and-abroad. Even the
price of some old medicines have been increasing as in the case of multiple
sclerosis drugs. The first generation of these drugs which entered the market in the
1990s had prices ranging between $8,000 to $11,000 a year. Despite having new
drugs entering the market, one drug that initially cost $8,700 now costs $62,000 a
year. In September 2015, the New York Times reported that the price of the drug
(Daraprim), which was acquired in August by Turing Pharmaceuticals, was raised
to $750 a tablet from $13.50, bringing the annual cost of treatment for some
patients to hundreds of thousands of dollars. Andrew Pollack, Drug Goes from
$13.50 a Tablet to $750, Overnight, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/business/a-huge-overnight-increase-in-adrugs-price-raises-protests.html?_r=1.
61. Schakowsky & Maybarduk, supra note 60.
62. Catherine Saez, At WTO, Experts Discuss Solutions To Drugs Innovation
Crisis; IP Not In The List, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Mar. 10, 2014), http://www.ipwatch.org/2014/10/03/at-wto-experts-discuss-solutions-to-drugs-innovation-crisisip-not-in-the-list/ (referencing the assertions of Anthony So, director of the
Program on Global Health and Technology Access at the Duke University Sanford
School of Public Policy).
63. Id.
64. Andrew Pollack, High Cost of Sovaldi Hepatitis C Drug Prompts a Call to
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can have a positive result of curing most cases of hepatitis C in
twelve weeks with few side effects.65 Such prices make this drug
largely unattainable by many citizens in developed countries
including Australia and Spain particularly for the latter where an
estimated 800,000 people infected with hepatitis C live.66 Anderson
Void Its Patents, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/
20/business/high-cost-of-hepatitis-c-drug-prompts-a-call-to-void-its-patents.html
?_r=0 [hereinafter Pollack, High Cost]. Another drug, harvoni, a prescription
medicine containing ledipasvir and sofosbuvir, used to treat chronic hepatitis C
infection in adults costs $95,000 for a course of treatment. Only Just the Beginning
of the End of Hepatitis C, 383 LANCET 281, 281 (2014); Susan Abram, Hepatitis C
Drugs Sovaldi and Harvoni Out of Reach for Most, Except Inmates, L.A. DAILY
NEWS (Oct. 26, 2015), http://www.dailynews.com/health/20151026/hepatitis-cdrugs-sovaldi-and-harvoni-out-of-reach-for-most-except-inmates&template=
printart; Philippe Douste-Blazy, Hepatitis C Medicines Must Be Made Accessible
Faster
Than
HIV
Drugs
Were,
GUARDIAN
(Mar.
7,
2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2014/mar/07/
hepatitis-c-medicines-hiv-aids-drugs; Gilead’s Harvoni and Sovaldi Demonstrate
Efficacy and Safety Among Chronic Hepatitis C Patients with Advanced Liver
Disease, GILEAD (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.gilead.com/news/pressreleases/2015/4/gileads-harvoni-and-sovaldi-demonstrate-efficacy-and-safetyamong-chronic-hepatitis-c-patients-with-advanced-liver-disease. Today’s hepatitis
C epidemic affects 150 million people around the world, killing 500,000 people
annually, according to the WHO. Hepatitis C: Fact Sheet N°164, WORLD HEALTH
ORG., http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs164/en/# (last updated July
2015); see also Avorn, supra note 29, at 1879 (“For example, Gilead Sciences did
not invent its blockbuster treatment for hepatitis C, sofosbuvir (Sovaldi), which it
priced at $1,000 per pill. Rather, it acquired the product from a small company
founded by the drug’s inventor, a faculty member at Emory University, much of
whose work on the usefulness of nucleoside viral inhibitors was federally funded.
Gilead paid $11 billion in late 2011 for the rights to market Sovaldi, an amount it
totally recouped in its first year of sales after approval of the drug in late 2013.”);
Anderson, Fat Profits, supra note 28 (“[B]etween April and June [of 2014], drug
company Gilead clocked sales of $3.5bn for its latest blockbuster hepatitis C drug
Sovaldi.”).
65. Abram, supra note 64; Douste-Blazy, supra note 64 (discussing how
hepatitis C medicine prior to Sovaldi and Harvoni caused severe side effects that
would discourage people from receiving treatment).
66. Melissa Davey, Medicines Forecast to Cost Taxpayers Millions More in
Secret TPP Trade Deal, GUARDIAN (Feb. 22, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/
australia-news/2015/feb/23/medicines-forecast-to-cost-taxpayers-millions-more-insecret-tpp-trade-deal. It was reported that during the summer of 2014, a number of
European countries, including France and Spain, spent months negotiating with the
company Gilead on the price of “Sovaldi.” The price fixed by Gilead was €56,000
per patient for a twelve-week treatment, that is to say €666 per tablet. According to
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states that “[i]f France were to treat all its hepatitis C patients with
Sovaldi, it would add €1.5bn ($1.9bn; £1.2bn) to the country’s drugs
bill.”67 This lack of an active diagnosis strategy, along with an
exorbitant price of approximately €25,000 per treatment just for
sofosbuvir, has conditioned a national plan that has only been able to
commit to the treatment of 5,000 patients with new direct acting
antivirals.68 This is despite the fact that some argue sofosbuvir is not
even new as it was previously developed using published
information and an existing compound.69 The list price of a year’s
supply of Kalydeco, a medicine used in the treatment of cystic
fibrosis is $311,000 and a standard course of treatment with Blincyto
for treating leukemia is about $178,000.70 The newer chronic
treatment regimes for HIV are close to $30,000, per year while
several treatments for rare diseases are priced at more than $200,000
per year.71
Failure to provide proper public health care can be seen in other
places as well. For example, in April 2014, the United Kingdom’s
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence rejected adothe newspaper Le Monde, the price of each tablet was 280 times more than the
production cost. In France, it is calculated that 250,000 patients should receive this
medicine, the cost of which would represent 7% of the annual State medicine
budget. For more, see Pascale Santi, Hépatite C: le nouveau hold-up des labos, LE
MONDE (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.lemonde.fr/sciences/article/2014/07/08/
nouveaux-traitements-de-l-hepatite-c-le-hold-up-des-labos_4452689_1650684.
html; see also Pollack, High Cost, supra note 64 (detailing the United States’
Medicaid program’s struggle to pay for Sovaldi).
67. Anderson, Pharmaceuticals, supra note 45.
68. Beatriz Becerra Basterrechea et al., Life Saving Medicines and Patent
Slaving Monopolies, PEAH (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.peah.it/2015/01/lifesaving-medicines-and-patent-slaving-monopolies/.
69. Priti Radhakrishnan, One Way to Lower Drug Prices, CNN (June 2, 2015),
http://edition.cnn.com/2015/06/02/opinions/radhakrishnan-drug-prices/index.html.
70. Ransdell Pierson, Exclusive: Amgen’s New Leukemia Drug to Carry
$178,000 Price Tag, REUTERS (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/usamgen-cancer-exclusive-idUSKBN0JV1YU20141217; Joseph Walker, Costly
Vertex Drug is Denied, and Medicaid Patients Sue, WALL ST. J. (July 16, 2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/costly-drug-vertex-is-denied-and-medicaid-patientssue-1405564205.
71. James Love, TPP, Designed to Make Medicine More Expensive, Reforms
More Difficult, MEDIUM (June 8, 2015), https://medium.com/@jamie_love/tppdesigned-to-make-medicine-more-expensive-reforms-more-difficulte6a94a5d4a18#.3z1i4ps1v.
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trastuzumab emtansine (Kadcyla), a new breast cancer medicine
from Roche, whose treatment course cost £90,831 per patient,
because it was too expensive for the National Health Service
(“NHS”).72 In the United States, Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer
Center, in New York, refused to prescribe a new colorectal cancer
drug priced at over $130,000 per year prompting the drug maker,
Sanofi, to cut the price in half in 2012.73 Similar stories continue in
many other parts in the world. MSF in a recent statement stated:
Today we see increasing failures with our current system of research and
development, whether with respect to Ebola, antibiotic resistance, or a
range of neglected diseases. We also see unaffordable prices for essential
new medicines, including up to 1000 USD per pill for new medicines to
treat Hepatitis C.74

The high prices of new medicines prompted more than 100
influential oncologists from over fifteen countries recently to
describe current prices of cancer medicines as “astronomical,
unsustainable and even immoral”75 and urged that “moral
72. Breast Cancer Drug Costing Tens of Thousands of Pounds More Than
Other Treatments ‘Unaffordable’ for NHS, NICE (Apr. 23, 2014),
http://www.nice.org.uk/news/press-and-media/breast-cancer-drug-costing-tens-ofthousands-of-pounds-more-than-other-treatments-unaffordable-for-nhs; see also
Velásquez, supra note 36, at 17 (finding that in another project, in 2010, “a group
of English academics analysed the most prescribed drugs in the National Health
Service (NHS) and calculated that approximately GBP 1 billion is wasted each
year due to the prescription of patented ‘me too drugs’, for which there is an
equally effective out of patent equivalent. What is considered to be a waste of State
funds resulting from the use of patented medicines in the English system is the
reality in developing countries simply because of the impossibility of accessing the
medicine for the majority of the population”).
73. Till, supra note 31.
74. Katy Athersuch, Médecins Sans Frontières, Address to the 136th WHO
Executive
Board
(Jan.
30,
2015)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.msfaccess.org/content/136th-who-eb-msf-intervention-gspa-publichealth-innovation-and-intellectual-property).
75. Andrew Pollack, Doctors Denounce Cancer Drug Prices of $100,000 a
Year, N.Y. TIMES, April 25, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/26/business/
cancer-physicians-attack-high-drug-costs.html?smid=pl-share; Jeremy Laurance,
Makers of Anticancer Drugs are “Profiteering,” Say 100 Specialists from Around
the World, BMJ, Apr. 30, 2013, at 1, 1; see Camille Abboud et al., The Price of
Drugs for Chronic Myeloid Leukemia (CML) is a Reflection of the Unsustainable
Prices of Cancer Drugs: From the Perspective of a Large Group of CML Experts,
121 BLOOD 4439 (2013).
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implications” should prevail in order to treat patients rather than
focus on profits.76
Finally, one should remember the “morning after” effect. In the
course of the coming years, producers will face challenge of the
expiry and/or revocation of a number of famous brand name
patents.77 Expiry of patents on key blockbuster drugs (“described as
the patent cliff”) is approaching soon.78 One 2012 estimate by
PricewaterhouseCoopers projects that between 2012 and 2018, patent
expiry and consequent generic entry will reduce revenues of R&Dbased pharmaceutical companies by about $148 billion.79 Stephen
Whitehead, chief executive of the Association of the British
Pharmaceuticals Industry, explains that “[o]ver the past three or four
years, we have seen the biggest collection of patent expiries in
history” and based on this he estimates that “[t]his has cost the
industry some £150bn ($240bn).”80 Indeed as Burdon and Sloper
explains in another study that the sales of Prozac fell 66% in the last
year following the expiry of patent protection which in subsequently
resulted in Eli Lilly’s reduction of its profit estimates three times in
the last twelve months.81 There is no doubt then that the opening of
the market for the entry of generic producers would hit hard these
companies and reduce prices to a margin of what it used to be sold
for.82
76. Abboud et al., supra note 75, at 4439.
77. See generally Jack DeRuiter & Pamela L. Holston, Drug Patent Expiration
and
the
“Patent
Cliff”,
U.S. PHARMACIST
(June
20,
2012),
http://www.uspharmacist.com/content/s/216/c/35249/dnnprintmode/true/skinsrc/
(estimating that top drug companies may lose hundreds of billions of dollars in the
near future to generic competition).
78. See id. (defining the “patent cliff” as a period where a number of lucrative
pharmaceutical patents will reach their expiration date).
79. STEVE ARLINGTON, PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS, FROM VISION TO
DECISION, PHARMA 2020 6 (2012).
80. Anderson, Pharmaceuticals, supra note 45.
81. Michael Burdon & Kristie Sloper, The Art of Using Secondary Patents to
Improve Protection, 3 INT’L J. MED. MARKETING 226, 226-27 (2003) (discussing
similar losses for GlaxoSmithKline’s AUGMENTIN and Akzo Nobel’s
REMERO).
82. See MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES [MSF], UNTANGLING THE WEB OF
ANTIRETROVIRAL PRICE REDUCTIONS 4 (13th ed. 2010) (explaining that
competition from generic medicines for AIDS treatment caused the price of the
first line triple therapy (estavudine, lamivudine, and nevirapine) to drop from
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Calls urging pharmaceutical companies to direct their investments
where real impact may be felt—i.e. inventing new medicines
affecting the majority of citizens all over the world—have been made
in recent times. Simply put, to effectively channel available
resources towards production lines rather than other promotional and
marketing activities.83

III. EVERGREENING, MORE PATENTS, AND
MORE MONOPOLY
Faced with the aforementioned challenges, the pharmaceutical
industry has been working to identify additional venues to sustain its
revenue streams. The need to find alternative routes for monopoly
protection through reinventing the “lifecycle management” of its
drugs prompted it to shift its focus on another area.84 Rather than
focusing on finding optimal solutions for its productivity challenges
and R&D problems, the focus shifted towards legislative norms and
legal doctrines. The obsession with “evergreening” in the industry
may be seen as one outcome of these initiatives.85
approximately $10,000 per patient per year in 2000 to approximately $67 per
patient per year).
83. See Marc-André Gagnon & Joel Lexchin, The Cost of Pushing Pills: A
New Estimate of Pharmaceutical Promotion Expenditures in the United States, 5
PLOS MED., no. 1, 2008, at 29, 32 (concluding that available data indicates more
resources are spent on marketing medicines rather than on researching and
developing new drugs); Novartis Set to Remain Top Spender as R&D Investment
Dips, EVALUATE (June 18, 2012), https://www.evaluategroup.com/Universal/
View.aspx?type=Story&id=302035&isEPVantage=yes (noting that the industry
spent $135 billion on research in 2011, which is less than 20% of sales); see also
Joseph Engelberg et al., Financial Conflicts of Interest in Medicine 38-39 (Jan.
2014) (working paper) (on file with University of California San Diego Rady
School of Management) (finding that pharmaceutical companies engage in
marketing techniques that encourage rent-seeking behaviour on the part of doctors
who prescribe the company’s drugs).
84. Stan
Bernard,
Rethinking
Product
Lifecycle
Management,
PHARMEXEC.COM (Feb. 1, 2013), http://www.pharmexec.com/print/197858?
page=full (challenging the pharmaceutical industry’s traditional approach of only
marketing a drug during its product lifecycle—regulatory approval to expiration of
the patent).
85. See generally Kate S. Gaudry, Evergreening: A Common Practice to
Protect New Drugs, 29 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 876, 878 (2011) (explaining that
pharmaceutical companies frequently engage in an evergreening strategy, which
utilizes patent law and FDA regulations to extend a company’s patent monopolies
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Accordingly, more patents and monopoly term extension
represented an integral element of the industry’s modern
management of its portfolios. An investigation carried out by the
European Union about the conduct and practices of the
pharmaceutical industry between the years 2000 and 2007 found that
a single medicine can be protected at the same time by up to 1300
patents or pending patent applications.86 Moreover, the number and
volume of lawsuits between originator companies and generic
companies has increased four-fold in the European Union.87 The
same study found that these lawsuits delay the entry of the generic
product to the market between six months and six years.88 The study
estimates that the savings resulting from the entry of generics could
have been approximately €3 billion, if the entry had occurred
immediately after the loss of exclusivity.89 In the United States,
Frank reports that branded drug firms “now carry an average of 10
patents for each drug—as compared with an average of 2 a decade
earlier.”90
In the light of the above discussion and the stagnation in the
pharmaceutical production of new medical entities, one may assume
that logically, the number of patents should drop drastically. To the
contrary, the recent decade witnessed phenomenal growth in the
number of patents granted in all fields including medicines.91 For
and FDA-grated exclusivities).
86. See Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry – Preliminary Report, Fact Sheet
“Originator-Generic Competition”, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/fact_sheet_2.pdf (last visited Feb. 25,
2016) (adding that many patent applications are submitted very late in a drug’s life
cycle in order to achieve the longest exclusivity period possible).
87. Id.
88. See Communication from the Commission, Executive Summary of the
Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Report, at 11, SEC (2009) 952 (July 8, 2009)
(finding that the average duration of court proceedings was 2.8 years).
89. Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry – Preliminary Report, Fact Sheet “Prices,
Time to Generic Entry and Consumer Savings”, EUR. COMM’N,
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/fact_sheet_1.pdf
(last visited Feb. 25, 2016).
90. Richard G. Frank, The Ongoing Regulation of Generic Drugs, 357 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1993, 1994 (2007).
91. See Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents 6 (Fed.
Reserve Bank St. Louis Research Div., Working Paper No. 2012-035A, 2012)
(contrasting the rising number of patents over the last thirty years with a lack of
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instance, in 1983 in the United States, 59,715 patents were issued; by
2003, 189,597 patents were issued; and in 2010, 244,341 patents
were approved.92 In less than three decades, the number of granted
patents more than quadrupled. At the same time, neither substantial
innovation occurred nor research and development expenditure were
demonstrated to correspond to the growth in the number of granted
patents.93
The above may be explained in part by the industry’s attempt to
prolong and extend the patent protection term resulting from
“evergreening” activities. A look at a number of specific examples
would be useful to illustrate the trend.
The drug Atorvastatin calcium is one of the most cited examples
in this regard.94 The drug is the medication for the treatment of high
cholesterol and was approved by the U.S. Food and Drugs
Administration (FDA) in December 1996 and was first marketed in
1997.95 The drug became one of the best-selling and successful drugs
in history.96 Notably, a patent was granted earlier for this drug in the
United States in 1987, and was due to expire in May 2006. However
and prior to its expiry in 2006, the patent was extended to September
2009 under a patent term extension provision.97 Subsequently, the
exclusivity period of the initial patent was also extended for an
additional period of six months, to March 2010, under a paediatric
exclusivity provision.98
In another 2012 study, Amin and Kesselheim identified the
evergreening patents associated with two important HIV medicines,
ritonavir and lopinavir.99 Their study found that the original ritonavir
increase in R&D expenditure or innovation).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 19-20 (“[I]t is apparent that the recent explosion of patents in the
U.S., the E.U. and Japan, has not brought about anything comparable in terms of
useful innovations and aggregate productivity.”).
94. See, e.g., Hans Georg Bartels et al., PROMOTING ACCESS TO MEDICAL
TECHNOLOGIES AND INNOVATION: INTERSECTIONS BETWEEN PUBLIC HEALTH,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TRADE 183 (2012) (highlighting the case of
Atorvastatin calcium to exemplify the problem of patent term extensions).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Tahir Amin & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Secondary Patenting Of Branded
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patent was filed in the United States in 1995, granted in 1996 and
was due to expire on April 25, 2015.100 The original lopinavir patent
was filed in 1996, granted in 1999, and is due to expire on November
21, 2016. Amin and Kesselheim found as of April 2011, a further
108 patent items were found for these two medicines—eighty-two
granted patents and twenty-six applications.101 Together these
evergreening patents could delay generic entry to at least 2028—
some thirteen to fourteen additional years after original patent
expiry.102 These evergreening patents cover related chemical
structures, methods of manufacture and methods of treatment.103
Another interesting case of evergreening is related to Tricor-1, a
cholesterol-fighting drug which rights were exclusively acquired by
Abbott in 2000.104 Following the lapse of the drug exclusivity
protection, a generic pharmaceutical company (Novopharm) applied
to the U.S. FDA to produce generic versions of the drug, which
would have resulted in the reduction of the price by 80%.105 To delay
the production of the generic version, Abbott filed for patent
infringement lawsuit which took months, and at the same time
enabled Abbott to produce Tricor-2 (which was almost exactly the
same as Tricor-1 with only difference in dosage where Tricor-1 came
in 67- and 134-milligram formulations, Tricor-2 would come in 54and 160-milligram dosages).106 By the time Novopharm’s generic
Pharmaceuticals: A Cast Study of How Patents On Two HIV Drugs Could Be
Extended For Decades, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2286 (2012) (asserting that the secondary
patents used to protect ritonavir and lopinavir from generic competition
demonstrate the widespread practice of pharmaceutical manufactures seeking to
extend market exclusivity for their products on questionable grounds).
100. Id. at 2288.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 2286.
103. Id. at 2288-89 (finding that the largest category of patents and applications
covered chemical structures, compositions, or formulations, which affect the
drug’s physical properties, such as stability, solubility, dissolution rate, absorption,
and bioavailability).
104. Sarah Kliff, Want To Cut Health Care Costs? Start Here., WASH. POST
(Apr. 21, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/want-tocut-health-care-costs-start-here/2012/04/20/gIQA2P0NWT_blog.html.
105. Id.
106. See Nicholas S. Downing et al., How Abbott’s Fenofibrate Franchise
Avoided Generic Competition, 172 ARCH INTERN MED. 724 (2012) (observing that
due to Abbott’s patent litigation, Tricor-2 did not face generic competition when it
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came onto the market, Abbott had already introduced Tricor-2 and
“made it doctors’ prescription of choice.”107 Six months after its
introduction onto the market, Tricor-2’s share represented 97
percent of all prescriptions for this type of medication in the market,
known as Fenofibrates.108 This was not the end of the story, over the
past decade, Abbott repeated the same process a few times, Tricor-3
(renamed with a different dosage branded Tripilix) replaced Tricor2.109 The cost implications of Abbott’s strategy were huge according
to the Annals of Internal Medicine which estimated that “if the
health-care system had come to rely on Novopharm’s generic
medication, our health-care system would be saving $700 million
every year. Overall, the use of generic drugs is estimated to save the
country $158 billion annually, which breaks down to $3 billion a
week.”110
Finally, a more current example is the case of Eli Lilly’s lung
cancer drug sold as Alimta.111 This drug has been generating over $2
million in annual sales and it is projected that it will generate $3.5
billion by 2016.112 The patent on the initial protected compound is
due to expire in 2017 however Eli Lilly filed and obtained a second
patent on the method of using the compound together with vitamins.
This second patent would last until 2022.113 This will have huge
financial implications.
Other studies indicate the impact of evergreening.114 Kapczynski et
al. found that secondary claims were common and added, on
average, 6.5 years to patent life and that patents which were filed late
launched).
107. Kliff, supra note 104.
108. Id.
109. See id. (describing the cycle of reformulation and renewed exclusivity for
the drug whenever generic competition seemed likely at the new dose level).
110. Id.
111. See Ho, supra note 42, at 315.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 316.
114. See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski et al., Polymorphs and Prodrugs and Salts (Oh
My!): An Empirical Analysis of “Secondary” Pharmaceutical Patents, 7 PLOS
ONE, no.12, Dec. 2012, at 1, 2-3 (stating that a better understanding of secondary
patenting is necessary because pharmaceutical companies view these patents as
crucial to their business models and only a few large-sample empirical studies of
secondary patents exist).
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during the life of the original compound were “more common for
higher sales drugs.”115 The same study found:
[E]liminating secondary patents could free up 36% of new medicines for
generic production, since only 64% of drugs in our sample had patents
with chemical compound claims. Additionally, for those drugs that still
come under patent because a chemical compound claim exists, exclusions
on secondary patents could limit the duration of patent protection by 4–5
years.116

In Australia, a 2013 study “analysing all of the patents associated
with 15 of the costliest drugs in Australia over the last 20 years”
found that on average, there are forty-nine patents per Active
Pharmaceutical Ingredient (API), of which about 25% are held by the
originator company—about twelve evergreening patents per API.117
In addition, the European Commission Enquiry Report found that in
Europe evergreening patenting is prevalent for pharmaceuticals and
again the average number of patents per API was greater for the
highest volume medicines.118

115. Id. at 1 (adding that secondary patents on method of use extend patent life
by 7.4 years on average); see also Ron A. Bouchard et al., Empirical Analysis of
Drug Approval-Drug Patenting Linkage For High Value Pharmaceuticals, 8 NW.
J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 174, 174-75 (2010) (examining the “paradoxical drug
approval-drug patenting linkage,” which provides the largest scope of intellectual
property protection to modified drugs rather than true innovation); Lisa Larrimore
Ouellette, Note, How Many Patents Does It Take to Make A Drug? Follow-On
Pharmaceutical Patents and University of Licensing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH.
L. REV. 299, 320 (2010) (finding that drugs patented by public-sector institutions
are less likely than their private-sector counterparts to have secondary patents, yet
over half of public sector drugs still have secondary patents).
116. Kapczynski et al., supra note 114, at 8.
117. Andrew F. Christie et al., Patents Associated With High-Cost Drugs in
Australia, 8 PLOS ONE, no. 4, Apr. 2013, at 1, 8 (discovering that the roughly
seventy five percent of patents owned by companies other than the drug’s
originator were mostly held by companies that did not have a record of developing
top-selling drugs).
118. See EUR. COMM’N, PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR INQUIRY, supra note 46, at
352 (questioning the efficacy of using secondary patents for follow-on products as
a means of preventing generic competition); see also Hazel V. J. Moir et al.,
Assessing the Impact of Alternative Patent Systems on the Cost of Health Care:
The TPPA and HIV Treatment in Vietnam 10 (Nov. 27, 2014) (unpublished
conference paper) (“For top-selling medicines the average number of patents and
patent applications was 237, compared to 98 for medicines in general.”).
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Interestingly, evergreening activities are not limited to prolonging
the protection term through the granting of additional legal
protection by patent offices. For instance, the drug Efexor is an
antidepressant drug developed by Pfizer which had major side effects
leading to its recall from the market in 2014.119 In its attempt to deal
with the side effects of the said drug, “Pfizer subsequently developed
new slow-release versions of the drug, called Efexor-XR, which
significantly reduced its side-effects.”120 Pfizer attempted to claim
further protection proclaiming that the slow-release versions were
different enough from the original to be granted new patents.
Although the claim was rejected, the legal battle delayed cheaper
generic versions of the drug from entering the market for two and
half years.121 A recent 2015 study explains the impact, stating that
“[b]y the time this patent was eventually declared invalid, the delay
to the generic market had cost taxpayers $209 million.”122 Moreover,
the study found that in general “evergreening” could delay generic
competition for up to twenty years.123

IV. THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND ITS HEALTHRELATED FLEXIBILITIES
Although the TRIPS Agreement was criticised by many for being
in favour of technology exporting countries,124 the mood shifted
119. See Caroline Cassels, Pfizer Recalls Effexor Antidepressant, WEBMD
(Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.webmd.com/depression/news/20140307/pfizer-recalleffexor (announcing the recall of Effexor because of possible contamination with a
heart drug that could cause faintness, dizziness, and abnormal or increased
heartbeat).
120. Davey, supra note 66 (observing that the slow-release version of the drug
became more widely prescribed than the original).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See Deborah H. Gleeson et al., Costs to Australian Taxpayers of
Pharmaceutical Monopolies As Proposals to Extend Them In the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement, 202 MED. J. AUSTL. 306, 306-07 (2015) (reporting that, in
1998, Australia introduced five-year delays for patents to be extended, and the
extensions in 2012-2013 have cost the Public Benefits Scheme an estimated $480
million in the long-term).
124. See Peter Drahos, BITs and BIPs: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4
J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 791, 802 (2001) (arguing that the benefits of TRIPS flow
towards the two leading exporters of intellectual property, the United States and
the European Union, because the most favoured nation principle in the WTO
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during the last decade towards calling upon developing countries to
deal with the agreement by taking a more pragmatic approach. In this
regard, calls to utilize and explore the policy space available under
the agreement have been made by many academics, civil society
groups, and various non-governmental organizations.125
The suggested approach calls upon developing countries to
activate and use the flexibilities available to them under the
agreement in a more pro-active manner. Exploring the “policy space”
as suggested, would mitigate the negative monopolistic impact of the
agreement on these countries and would also go some way in
assisting these countries when dealing with their national public
health challenges.126
Following are some examples of the health-related flexibilities
available under the agreement to member states:
- Transitional periods. According to the WTO, least developed countries
(LDCs) are given an extended transition period to protect intellectual
property under the WTO’s TRIPS Agreement.127 This is in recognition of
their special requirements and status, their economic, financial and
administrative constraints, and the need for flexibility so that they can
create a viable technological base. Under TRIPS Council Decision, IP/C/
25, Extension of the Transition Period under article 66.1 of the TRIPS
Agreement for LDC Members for Certain Obligations with Respect to
Pharmaceutical Products, LDC members were not obliged, with respect to
pharmaceutical products, to implement or apply sections 5 (Patents) and 7
(Protection of Undisclosed Information) or to enforce rights provided for
under these sections from the TRIPS Agreement until January 1, 2016.128
Under General Council decision, WT/L/478, “the obligations of leastdeveloped country Members under paragraph 9 of article 70 of the TRIPS
Agreement shall be waived with respect to pharmaceutical products until
January 1, 2016.” A request on behalf of LDCs for further extension was

requires all WTO members who have entered into a TRIPS agreement to extend
the benefits to all other WTO members).
125. See, e.g., SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE
GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 17-20 (2003)
(contextualizing TRIPS in the larger movement of international neo-liberalism
championed by U.S. foreign policy).
126. See generally COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, supra note 5.
127. Id. at 162 (maintaining that least developed countries could use transitional
period extensions to give them the opportunity to devise appropriate intellectual
property regimes and establish administrative and regulatory infrastructure).
128. Id. at 40.
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made late 2014 and an extension was granted accordingly.129
- Compulsory licensing. A tool which the state authorizes a third party to
exploit patented inventions, generally against a specified royalty made to
the patent holder provided that several conditions set under the TRIPS
Agreement are complied with.130 The objective behind this is to curtail
anti-competitive behaviour and ensure the transfer of technology and
dissemination of knowledge.
- Government use exceptions. A tool which grants the state the right to
use the patent without obtaining the consent of the patent holder for the
purpose of public interest, including public health necessities. Although
government use conditions are similar to compulsory licensing,
government use exceptions provides an added advantage by fast-tracking
the process, through granting the government the right to use the
pharmaceutical patent without the need for prior negotiations with the
owner.131
- Parallel importation. This tool gives the option to obtain patented
products when they are lawfully available in a foreign market at a lower
price, thus enabling countries to shop for cheaper patented products. This
requires as a prerequisite that a country adopt an exhaustion regime
suitable to its needs and priorities.132
- Exceptions to patents rights. Article 30 of TRIPS provides that
members “may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights
conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably
conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of
the legitimate interests of third parties.”133 However, the above provision
does not define the scope of the permissible exceptions thus awarding
member countries some considerable discretion to operate. Examples of
these exceptions include the Bolar exception and the research and
experimental use exception.134

129. Id. at 51 (remarking that least developed countries with domestic
legislation protecting pharmaceutical patents would need to amend their laws to
take advantage of the Doha Declaration’s deferral of pharmaceutical patent
protection until at least 2016).
130. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establish the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] (listing the
limitations on use of intellectual property by third-parties authorized by the
government).
131. Id. art. 8.
132. See id. art. 6 (declaring that exhaustion of intellectual property rights is not
relevant to the dispute settlement process under TRIPS).
133. Id. art. 30.
134. See MOHAMMED K. EL SAID, PUBLIC HEALTH RELATED TRIPS-PLUS
PROVISIONS IN BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, A POLICY GUIDE FOR
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- Standards of patentability. Under TRIPS, patent protection must be
granted for products and processes which are new, involve an inventive
step and are industrially applicable.135 However, each of these are not
defined and can be interpreted and applied by member states in
accordance with their national priorities and objectives. “For example,
TRIPS does not specify the patenting of new uses of known products,
including pharmaceutical drugs, thus allowing member countries the
possibility of rejecting these new uses for lack of novelty, inventive step
or industrial applicability.”136
- Other procedural flexibilities. Another identified policy tool that may
be used to improve the quality of granted patents and limits
“evergreening” is pre-grant and post-grant patent oppositions, in addition
to patent revocation proceedings.137 These methods have been used at
different times in a wide range of developed and developing countries.
Such proceedings enable interested parties to bring claims before the
patent office on the basis that a particular patent does not meet local
requirements.138

Although these flexibilities are available for member states to put
into practise, the above flexibilities do not apply automatically in
many instances but require a great deal of legislative, administrative
and institutional effort. Accordingly, these flexibilities should be
explicitly incorporated under the national legal regime of as a part of
a pro-active national agenda.139

NEGOTIATORS AND IMPLEMENTORS IN THE WHO EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN
REGION 127 (2010) [hereinafter EL SAID, PUBLIC HEALTH] (explaining that the
Bolar exception permits the use of a patented invention for the purpose of
obtaining approval of a generic product before the patent expires, and the
experimental use exception allows for the use of a patented product in scientific
and commercial experimentation without the consent of the patent holder).
135. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 136, art. 27.
136. EL SAID, PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 134, at 128.
137. Mohammed El Said & Amy Kapczynski, Access to Medicines: The Role
Of Intellectual Property Law and Policy 5 (July 9, 2011) (working paper) (on file
with Global Commission on HIV and the Law) (adding that the period to initiate
post-grant opposition applications varies between countries).
138. Id. at 6 (citing examples of successful pre and post-grant patent
oppositions in Thailand and India).
139. Id. at 9 (commenting that few countries in Africa, Latin America, and parts
of Asia have adopted the full range of flexibilities permissible); see also EL SAID,
PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 134, at 128 (asserting that implementing these
flexibilities in a national legal regime may involve new national committees,
legislative tools and bylaws, and proper judicial training).
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The actual utilization and use of the above flexibilities has in fact
supported the above view regarding their importance. Many case
studies from both developed and developing countries affirm the role
played by these flexibilities in enhancing the affordability and
accessibility of medicines to patients all over the world.140
There is no scarcity of evidence with relation to the positive
impact compulsory licensing has had upon improving access to
medicines. For instance, Canada used the system many times in order
to ensure that products were made available to the public at the
lowest possible price while also rewarding the inventor reasonably.141
Ho comments on Canada’s experience stating that “this was
Canada’s approach and until NAFTA, over a thousand applications
for compulsory licenses were made and the majority were
granted.”142 With relation to medicines and between the years 1969
and 1987, Canada used compulsory licensing provisions to promote
competition between originator medicines and generics.143 As
recently as 1987, the use of compulsory licensing provisions was
curtailed due to change in policy.144 Jones et al. investigated the
impact of originator-generic competition on medicine prices between
the years 1981 and 1994 in Canada.145 In a study that sampled eightytwo therapeutic drug categories, they found that generic competition
140. See, e.g., EL SAID, PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 134, at 131 (providing a
case study on the use of flexibilities in India).
141. See Ho, supra note 42, at 328 (remarking that despite Canada’s intention
to give due reward to the inventor, patent owners tend to find compulsory license
schemes as unsatisfactory).
142. Id.; see also Jerome H. Reichman & Catherine Hasenzahl, Non-Voluntary
Licensing of Patented Inventions: Historical Perspective, Legal Framework Under
TRIPS, and Overview of the Practice in Canada and the USA v (UNCTAD-ICTSD
Project on IPRS and Sustainable Dev., Issue Paper No. 5, 2003) (holding that
Canada’s regular use of compulsory licenses for pharmaceuticals allowed it to
establish a generic medicine industry providing low prices of consumer drugs).
143. Reichman & Hasenzahl, supra note 142, at 20 (claiming that Canada’s
compulsory licensing scheme produced some of the lowest consumer drug prices
in the industrialized world).
144. Id.
145. See J.C.H. Jones et al., Patents, Brand-Generic Competition and the
Pricing of Ethical Drugs in Canada: Some Empirical Evidence from British
Columbia, 1981-1994, 33 APPLIED ECON. 947, 947 (2001) (stating that the study
used a sample of eighty-two drugs from the British Columbia Pharmacare
Programme).
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moderated medicine prices but that this effect was reduced after
1987.146 They also found that price decrease after 1987 was slower
and lower. Within the generics market, there is a strong effect of first
entry, with the first generic gaining a substantial market share as well
as prices above the minimum.147 The overall conclusion from the
study is the well-established fact; “that facilitating generic entry, and
therefore competition, would reduce prices.”148
There has been a noticeable increase in the use of compulsory
licensing by developing countries in recent years too. India recently
issued one compulsory license.149 In March 2013, India issued a
compulsory license to Natco Pharma to manufacture an affordable
generic version of the German pharmaceutical company Bayer
AG’s kidney and liver cancer drug Nexavar (chemotherapy drug
sorafenib tosylate) in the Indian market.150 The compulsory license
effect on the drug’s price was clear and substantial: it brought down
the prices to approximately $160 for a month’s dose—a fraction of
the original price of approximately $5,098.151 The conditions of the
compulsory licence grants Bayer a six per cent royalty only on sales
by Natco.152
Another example is related to Brazil’s issuance of compulsory
licenses. In 2007, the country issued a compulsory license for the
antiretroviral (“ARV”) drug Efavirenz.153 The drug is mostly used
146. See id. at 955 (finding that after market exclusivity was extended to
branded drugs in 1987, generic competition’s moderating effect was reduced).
147. See id. at 954 (concluding that generic first mover prices typically
exceeded minimum generic prices by 10% or more).
148. Moir et al., supra note 118, at 13.
149. See Patralekha Chatterjee, India’s First Compulsory License Upheld, but
Legal Fights Likely to Continue, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Apr. 3, 2013),
http://www.ip-watch.org/2013/03/04/indias-first-compulsory-licence-upheld-butlegal-fights-likely-to-continue/ (reporting the Indian judiciary’s verdict upholding
the first compulsory licence issued to an Indian generic drug manufacturer).
150. Id.
151. See id. (adding that Doctors Without Borders urged Bayer to refrain from
appealing the compulsory license grant considering the reality that Bayer’s prices
were too high for the Indian market).
152. Id. (noting that the 7% royalty awarded to Bayer is higher than some
national and international royalty guidelines).
153. See Very Zolotaryova, Are We There Yet?: Taking “TRIPS” To Brazil And
Expanding Access to HIV/AIDS Medication, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1099, 1099
(2007) (recounting that the Brazilian President’s decree to import a generic version
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imported ARV for AIDS treatment in Brazil (covering approximately
38% of HIV patients).154 The current prices sold by the manufacture
(Merck) at that time, were $580 per patient per year.155 As a result of
compulsory licensing, the prices charged for generic product resulted
in an annual cost per patient in the range between $163 to $166.156
Based on this, savings of around $236 million were estimated to have
been made by the year 2012, when the patent expired.157
Thailand also provides an active developing country case study in
that regard.158 The country issued so far more compulsory licenses
than any other developing country with relation to medicines.
Between 2005 and 2006, the Thai government issued multiple
compulsory licences.159 Two of the licences covered ARVs
(Efavirenz, marketed as Stocrin by Merck, and Lopinavir/Ritonavir,
marketed as Kaletra by Abbott).160 These compulsory licences
resulted in substantial price reduction and increase in the number of
patients receiving the medicine in the country. For instance, the
immediate result of issuing the Efavirenz licence was the acquisition
by the Thai health authorities of its generic version from the Indian
producer Ranbaxy for USD$216 per patient/year, over a 50%
decrease from Merck’s price of USD$468.161 By early 2008 the
number of patients using Lopinavir/Ritonavir had tripled in
Thailand.162
More recently, in April 2010, the Ecuadorean intellectual property
office granted its first compulsory licence, also for the ARV

of Merck’s Efavirenez came after the company failed to negotiate an appropriate
price with the government of Brazil).
154. Id. at 1111, n. 84.
155. Beatrice Stirner, Compulsory Licensing of Efavirenz in Brazil, Summary of
the Presentation of J.M. do Nascimento Júnior, ACCESS TO PHARMACEUTICALS
(Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.accesstopharmaceuticals.org/case-studies-in-globalhealth/efavirenz-brazil/.
156. See id.
157. MARTIN KHOR, COMPULSORY LICENSE AND “GOVERNMENT USE” TO
PROMOTE ACCESS TO MEDICINES: SOME EXAMPLES 15 (2014).
158. El Said & Kapczynski, supra note 137, at 7.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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combination of Lopinavir/Ritonavir.163 The licence resulted in
substantial decrease in the prices of the medicine. It was reported that
Ecuador’s compulsory licence “immediately reduced the cost of a
major public HIV drug purchase . . . by 27 percent” and it is
expected that prices will fall further, reaching a reduction of over
50%.164 As the above examples show, the issuance of compulsory
licenses can result in substantial reduction of prices and
improvement of accessibility of drugs to patients.
Another important flexibility is government use licenses. For
instance, Ghana issued a government use order in 2005 to import
from India generic versions of selected ARVs which are patented in
Ghana for HIV drugs to be used for the purposes of government use
in the country.165 Some estimates that the cost of ARVs dropped as a
result more than 50% from $495 to $235 for year’s treatment.166 In
another case, Malaysia was the first country in Asia to issue a
“government use” licence for the importation of generic ARVs in
2003.167 This resulted in reducing the average cost of the Malaysian’s
Ministry of Health treatment per patient per month from $315 to $58,
an 81% reduction.168
More recently, the issue of patentability criteria has been subject
to increased legal debate in a number of countries.169 India has one of
the strictest patentability criteria that could be found anywhere in the
world.170 To the dissatisfaction of drug producers who started to find
it more difficult to obtain new patents there (especially on minor
improvements or new/second uses), challenges to the system were
made.171 More specifically, section 3(d) of the 1970 India Patents Act
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. KHOR, supra note 157, at 10.
166. Id. at 15.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See, e.g., Patralekha Chatterjee, Novartis Loses Patent Bid: Lessons From
India’s 3(d) Experience, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Jan. 4, 2013), http://www.ipwatch.org/2013/04/01/novartis-loses-patent-bid-lessons-from-indias-3dexperience/ [hereinafter Chatterjee, Novartis] (describing the Indian Supreme
Court’s decision to uphold more stringent standards for granting patents).
170. See id. (noting that Argentina and the Philippines also have similarly strict
standards).
171. See id. (highlighting cases regarding denied patents for HIV drugs
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was the target of such challenge. The section prohibits patenting of
new uses of known products (including medicines) and new forms,
formulations, and dosages unless they shows significant
enhancements of therapeutic efficacy.172 This provision has recently
led to the denial of a patent to Novartis on the cancer medicine,
imatinib mesylate (sold by Novartis as Glivec), leading to a sevenyear court battle culminating in the Indian Supreme Court’s
reaffirmation of the strict interpretation of section 3(d).173 In 2014,
the same section of the India Patent Act “was used to deny a patent
on Gilead’s blockbuster hepatitis C medicine, sofosbuvir (sold by
Gilead as Solvadi),174 potentially saving India and the developing
world hundreds of millions of dollars in treatment costs.”175 The
results of the consistent Indian approach were evident. It was found
that “[o]ver the next five years, as a result, the continued availability
of generic drugs saved governments half a billion dollars globally
and medicines reached 13 million people living with HIV/AIDS
worldwide.”176
Other countries are increasingly following India’s patentability
path. The Philippines patent law, as amended in 2008, introduced a
section similar to the Indian 3(d) section (although less stringent than
India’s Patent Act).177 China has reformed its Patent Act in 2008 and
appealed by pharmaceutical companies).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. It was reported that Egypt also followed suit by finding the application
lacking novelty. Although no official rejection was made yet, it was reported:
[S]enior official at EGYPO has said that Egypt will not grant sofosbuvir a patent. The
reason lies in the weakness of the application submitted by the company. Technical
examination of the compound has revealed that it is not novel chemically, and
therefore does not fulfill the criteria of novelty and inventiveness, both of which are
necessary for a pharmaceutical compound to be patented.

See Heba Wanis, Egypt Will Not Patent New Hepatitis C Drug, MADA MASR (May
23, 2014), http://www.madamasr.com/opinion/egypt-will-not-patent-new-hepatitisc-drug.
175. Brook K. Baker, Opinion: Prof Brook K Baker on the Impact of US
Pressure to Change India’s IP Laws, FIN. EXPRESS (Jan. 30, 2015),
http://www.financialexpress.com/article/pharma/latest-updates/opinion-profbrook-k-baker-on-the-impact-of-us-pressure-to-change-indias-ip-laws/36919/.
176. Priti Radhakrishan, One Way to Lower Drug Prices, CNN (June 2, 2015),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/02/opinions/radhakrishnan-drug-prices/.
177. Carolos M. Correa, Tackling the Proliferation of Patents: How to Avoid
Undue Limitation to Competition and the Public Domain 6 (South Ctr., Working
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in a similar fashion to that of India’s law, introduced a more rigorous
standard for the non-obviousness requirement.178 According to the
recent Chinese Patent Act, in order for the non-obviousness
requirement to be fulfilled, the invention must possess prominent and
substantive differentiating features, as well as be representative of
significant improvement in comparison with the state of the art.179
Aiming to strengthen the standards for patent granting, “Australia
adopted in 2012 the ‘Raising the Bar Act’ which, inter alia, raised the
requirements for patentability and disclosure, and expanded the
grounds for re-examination of a granted patent to all substantive
grounds considered during examination.”180
Following the same path, in 2012, Argentina introduced new
guidelines on the patentability of pharmaceutical products and
processes with the objective of limiting evergreening of
pharmaceutical patents.181 The impact was visible in a short period of
time. Velásquez demonstrates the impact by stating:
A policy and strategy change at the patent office level could lead to
significant changes. In Argentina, for example, after the introduction of
new guidelines for the examination of pharmaceutical patents in 2012, the
number of patents granted was 54, while in Mexico, a similar-sized
market to Argentina, the number of patents granted in 2012 for

Paper No. 52, 2014) [hereinafter Correa, Tackling] (“While in the latter the
concept of enhanced efficacy – as a condition of patentability – is understood to
allude to the ‘therapeutic efficacy’ of a drug, in Philippines it may encompass ‘any
of the “advantageous properties” (e.g. bioavailability, stability, solubility among
others) exhibited by the new form of a known substance.’”).
178. See Patent Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, rev’d Dec. 27, 2008), art. 22, STATE INTELL. PROP. OFF.
P.R.C. (China).
179. Id.; see also IPR2, THIRD REVISION OF CHINA’S PATENT LAW, LEGAL
TEXTS AND DOCUMENTS ON THE DRAFTING PROCESS 2006-2008 art. 22 (2010).
180. Correa, Tackling, supra note 177.
181. See Federico A. Aulmann, New Patentability Guidelines for
Pharmaceutical
Inventions,
INT’L
L.
OFFICE
(Aug.
6,
2012),
http://www.internationallawoffice.com/Newsletters/Intellectual-Property/
Argentina/Obligado-Cia/New-patentability-guidelines-for-pharmaceuticalinventions (“[T]he new resolution affects the possibility of obtaining patent
protection for pharmaceutical inventions by changing the criteria by which the
novelty and inventive step of such inventions will be examined, or even
considering some as discoveries instead of inventions.”).
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pharmaceutical products was 2500.182

In conclusion, there are clear benefits made as a result of the
utilisation of the TRIPS flexibilities resulting in lowering drug prices
and increasing the accessibility of medicines at the national level.

V. THE RATHCHING UP OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY PROTECTION AND THE NEGATIVE
IMPACT OF TRIPS-PLUS RULES ON PUBLIC
HEALTH AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES
As a result of these challenges facing the pharmaceutical industry,
efforts were channelled towards exploring alternative methods to
preserve and prolong the “lifecycle management” of the production
process of pharmaceutical medicines beyond the standards of the
TRIPS Agreement.
Although many developing countries were hoping that in
exchange for the TRIPS Agreement they would gain concessions in
other fields including market access and agricultural subsidies and
therefore cut their losses short, little has been achieved on that front.
Not only this, in fact TRIPS failed to achieve stability in the global
regulation of intellectual property rights. This is attributed to the fact
that it adopts a “minimum standards” of protection approach, which
means higher levels of protection are tolerated if countries opted to
do so.183
Following the introduction of the TRIPS Agreement, developed
countries embarked on a process of pushing for even higher levels of
protection beyond those stipulated under the TRIPS Agreement
through a number of trading arrangements.184 Preferential trade
agreements (“PTAs”) embodying bilateral and regional free trade
182. Velásquez, supra note 36, at 19.
183. See JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2003).
184. See generally Peter Drahos, Developing Countries and International
Intellectual Property Standard-setting, 5 J. WORLD. INTELL. PROP. 765, 783 (2002)
(“There is not much that developing countries can do about U.S. and EU
bilateralism on intellectual property.”); Mohammed El-Said, From TRIPS-minus to
TRIPS to TRIPS-plus: Implications of IPRs for the Arab World, 8 J. WORLD
INTELL. PROP. 53 (2005) (discussing the impact in Arab states of developed
countries’ push for stricter intellectual property regulation).
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agreements (“FTAs”), and other plurilateral arrangements resulted in
the introduction of additional levels of intellectual property
protection, a phenomenon which became to be known as TRIPSPlus.185
For the pharmaceutical industry, the proposed changes to the
global intellectual property regime meant taking the lead in
advocating the strengthening and prolonging of the term of patent
protection, resulting in additional monopoly years. Maintaining
higher prices of medicines provided pharmaceutical producers with
an opportunity to maintain their market dominance and annual
profits through evergreening.186 In a recent co-op, Nobel Prize
laureate Paul Krugman explains with relation to the recently signed
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (“TPP”):
So why do some parties want this deal so much? Because as with many
“trade” deals in recent years, the intellectual property aspects are more
important than the trade aspects. Leaked documents suggest that the US is
trying to get radically enhanced protection for patents and copyrights; this
is largely about Hollywood and pharma rather than conventional
exporters. What do we think about that? Well, we should never forget that
in a direct sense, protecting intellectual property means creating a
monopoly – letting the holders of a patent or copyright charge a price for
something (the use of knowledge) that has a zero social marginal cost. In
that direct sense this introduces a distortion that makes the world a bit
poorer.187

So how do PTAs and FTAs increase intellectual property
protection levels beyond the TRIPS standards? The objective of
TRIPS-Plus obligations is to undermine and weaken the remaining
flexibilities available under the international intellectual property
regime thus making it more difficult for developing countries to
utilise such flexibilities. There are a number of areas where this may
185. Ermias Tekeste Biadgleng & Jean-Christophe Maur, The Influence of
Preferential Trade Agreements on the Implementation of Intellectual Property
Rights in Developing Countries: A First Look 1, 21 (Int’l Ctr. for Trade &
Sustainable Dev., Issue Paper No. 33, 2011); see also Paul Krugman, TPP at the
NABE, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Mar. 11, 2015), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/
2015/03/11/tpp-at-the-nabe/ (discussing the pitfalls of the TPP multilateral trade
agreement).
186. TPP: Threats to Affordable Medicines, PUB. CITIZEN (Dec. 29, 2015),
http://www.citizen.org/documents/TPP-IP-Factsheet-December-2015.pdf.
187. Krugman, supra note 185.
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take place with relevance to patents and public health. These include
the following:
- Expanding the scope of pharmaceutical patents and creating new
drug monopolies: this is achieved through a number of ways such as:
- lowering the patentability standards,
- requiring patents be available for surgical and treatment methods,
and
- minor variations on old medicines, new and second uses.
- Further extension of protection to biological products which include
vaccines, blood and blood components, and gene therapies in addition
to other forms of protection.
- Extension of monopolies by extending patent terms if review at the
patent office or regulatory authority exceeds a prescribed period of time.
Such leads to “evergreening.”
- Risk facilitating patent abuse by requiring countries to condition
marketing approval on patent status (patent linkage). Under linkage,
patents, even ones that should not have been granted, block generic
market entry.
- Protection and Extension of “data exclusivity”: by providing at least
5 years exclusivity for information related to new products and 3 more in
cases of new uses for old medicines – even when that information is
disclosed and available in the public domain.
- Prohibition/restriction pre-grant oppositions – forbid challenges to
weak or invalid patents until after they have been granted.
- Regulate the decisions to reimburse new drugs, and give drug
companies new rights to challenge decisions on reimbursements if not
favourable as currently proposed under the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP).
- Require new forms of intellectual property enforcement–grant:
customs detaining shipments, including in-transit shipments, suspected of
non-criminal
trademark/copyright/patent
infringements;
require
mandatory injunctions for alleged intellectual property infringements;
raise damages amounts, etc.188

There has been growing concern over the impact of recent TRIPSPlus agreements on public health and access to medicines, in
particular the ongoing negotiations on the TPP and Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (“TTIP”).189 One of the major
188. See EL SAID, PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 134, at 125-96.
189. Id.; see, e.g., Phillip Inman, UN Calls for Suspension of TTIP Talks Over
Fears
of
Human
Rights
Abuses,
Guardian
(May
4,
2015),
http://www.theguardian.com/global/2015/may/04/ttip-united-nations-human-rightsecret-courts-multinationals (raising concerns that TTIP gives too much power to
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concerns about the process of negotiating these agreements is the
evident lack of transparency and public consultation.190 Stiglitz urged
the United States government by stating:
Powerful companies appear to have been given influence over the
proceedings, even as full access is withheld from many government
officials from the partnership countries. . . . [T]he T.P.P. could block
cheaper generic drugs from the market. Big Pharma’s profits would rise,
at the expense of the health of patients and the budgets of consumers and
governments. . . . We can’t be sure which of these features have made it
through this week’s negotiations. What’s clear is that the overall thrust of
the intellectual property section of the T.P.P. is for less competition and
higher drug prices. The effects will go beyond the 12 T.P.P. countries.
Barriers to generics in the Pacific will put pressure on producers of such
drugs in other countries, like India, as well.191

The discussion surrounding the negative impact of the above
TRIPS-Plus rules is not a theoretical one. The negative impact of
TRIPS-Plus rules could be seen in accordance with emerging
evidence from many parts of the world. Following are some
examples in the area of public health.
Data exclusivity has been one of the most controversial issues in
recent years because of its direct impact on access to medicines in
many countries. A form of protection, data exclusivity restricts the
use of clinical test data on pharmaceutical products by national drug
regulatory authorities for the approval of generic medicines for a
certain period of time.192 In addition, data exclusivity protection
prevents generic producers from relying on such data in the course of
establishing the efficacy and safety of their products, in some cases
multinational corporations, undermining democracy and rule of law).
190. See, e.g., Margot E. Kaminski, Don’t Keep the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Talks Secret, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/14/
opinion/dont-keep-trade-talks-secret.html (noting that free trade agreements have
implications far beyond “imports, tariffs or overseas jobs” and that the TPP’s
secretive negotiation process only involves industry insiders while excluding the
general public).
191. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Don’t Trade Away Our Health, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/31/opinion/dont-trade-away-ourhealth.html?_r=2.
192. Jerome H. Reichman, Rethinking the Role of Clinical Trial Data in
International Intellectual Property Law: The Case for a Public Goods Approach,
13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2009).
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effectively requiring unethical and expensive repetition of clinical
trials hence delaying the entry of generics into the market.193 Data
exclusivity may apply even if no patent protection exists and may
also curb the exercise of compulsory licensing.194 In fact, some have
argued that where available, pharmaceutical producers may even
favour obtaining data exclusivity protection to that of patent
protection.195 Indeed this was evident in the case of Jordan where was
found that “most pharmaceutical companies have not bothered to
apply for patent protection for medicines launched onto the
Jordanian market” but relied on data exclusivity.196
There are many studies detailing the negative impact of data
exclusivity.197 The case of Colchicine provides an interesting
example in this regard. In the United States, the price of this drug,
which is mainly used for treatment of gout conditions, has increased
for more than 5,000% as a result of the introduction of data
exclusivity protection in 2009.198 This caused some uproar since the
drug has been known and “been in use for thousands of years and
costs almost nothing to produce” locally, hence it is neither new nor
inventive and therefore should not be allowed to be patented or
granted legal protection.199 As a result of data exclusivity protection,
however, the U.S. FDA started to accept “clinical data from a oneweek trial of the drug and granted data exclusivity to URL Pharma,”
which led to the gigantic price increase of Colchicine.200 Chakrabarti
193. Bryan Mercurio, TRIPS-Plus Provisions in FTAs: Recent Trends, in
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 215, 227 (Lorand
Bartels & Federico Ortino eds., 2006) (“[A] generic manufacturer wishing to
market and distribute a generic whilst the period of data exclusivity is in force
must conduct its own clinical trials and other data and submit its findings to the
national authority.”).
194. EL SAID, PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 134, at 140; Kapczynski et al., supra
note 114, at 2.
195. EL SAID, PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 134, at 139.
196. Rohit Malpani, All Costs, No Benefits: How TRIPS-Plus Intellectual
Property Rules in the US-Jordan FTA Affect Access to Medicines 7 (Oxfam Int’l,
Briefing Paper No. 102, 2007).
197. See EL SAID, PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 134, at 133-43.
198. Gargi Chakrabarti, Need of Data Exclusivity: Impact on Access to
Medicine, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS 325, 332 (2014).
199. Id. (noting that generic formulations of Colchicine were widely available
for a significant time in the market).
200. Id.
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explains, “URL Pharma subsequently sued to force other
manufactures off the market, and raised prices from US$ 0.09 to 4.85
per pill.”201
The case of Guatemala is also interesting in this context. A study
examined the availability of certain drugs in Guatemala and found
that as a result of the signing of the Central American Free Trade
Agreement (“CAFTA”), “intellectual property rules reduced access
to some generic drugs already on the market and delayed new entry
of other generics.”202 Even worse, the study found that some drugs
protected from competition in Guatemala will become available in
the U.S. market for generic competition even before generic versions
will be legally available in Guatemala.203 The CAFTA impact is also
felt in other countries:
[A] 2009 study commissioned by ICTSD concluded that the CAFTA-DR
would lead to an annual price increase for active ingredients in Costa Rica
of between 18 per cent and 40 per cent by 2030, requiring increased
public spending in the range of US$ 2 million to US$ 3.357 million. The
strongest repercussions were expected from standards on patentability
criteria and standards on test data exclusivity.204

Another study cited by Chakrabrti determined that once
Guatemala enacted data exclusivity protection, prices of some
medicine increased as much as 846% even though just a small
number of them were protected by a patent.205
Jordan also provides an interesting case study in this area. The
U.S.-Jordan FTA signed in 2001 was the first FTA to include a
detailed intellectual property chapter which contains many TRIPS-

201. Id.
202. Ellen R. Shaffer & Joseph E. Brenner, A Trade Agreement’s Impact On
Access To Generic Drugs, 28 HEALTH AFF. w957, w957 (2009).
203. Id.
204. Bartels et al., supra note 94, at 190.
205. Chakrabarti, supra note 198, at 332; see also Shaffer & Brenner, supra
note 202, at w962 (“In each case, the data-protected drugs are much more
expensive than non-protected drugs in the same therapeutic class. For example, the
insulin Lantus costs 846 percent more than Isophane insulin; the antifungal Vfend
costs 810 percent more than the non-data-protected amphotericin B; and the
intravenous antibiotic Invanz costs 342 percent more than the non-data-protected
Meropenem (Meronem).”).
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Plus obligations.206 With relation to data exclusivity, the FTA
provided for five years of data protection plus three years for new
uses of known compounds and patent linkage notification.207 In 2007,
Oxfam conducted a study on the impact of the FTA on the country
and found some alarming results.208 The study found that since 2001
medicine prices in Jordan have increased by 20% (this led to price
increases between two and ten-fold for key medicines to treat
cardiovascular disease and cancer), and data protection has delayed
generic entry for 79% of medicines newly launched between 2002
and 2006.209 The study estimates that the availability of generic
equivalents would have reduced Jordan’s expenditure on medicines
by between $6.3 and $22 million between mid-2002 and 2006.210 The
study draws some comparisons with the situation of Egypt which has
also implemented TRIPS but not TRIPS-plus obligations. In
comparison to Egypt, medicine prices are between two and six times
higher in Jordan.211 A more recent study on the same case by Abbott
et al. also affirmed the same results and found that between 1999 and
2004, there was a 17% increase in total medicines expenditure in
Jordan.212 Compared to the Oxfam study, Abbott et al. found a loss of
$18 million in 2004—larger than the additional outlays of between
$6 and $22 million between 2002 and 2006 found in the Oxfam
study.213 Abbott et al. concluded that the provisions for data
protection arising from the FTA had the most significant effect on
the price of medicines on Jordan.214
The negative impact of TRIPS-Plus rules is not confined to data
exclusivity or to developing countries. For example, it is believed
that the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (“CETA”)
206. Mohammed El Said, The Morning After: Trips-Plus, FTAs, and Wikileaks,
Fresh Insights on the Implementation and Enforcement of IP Protection in
Developing Countries, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 71, 73 (2012) [hereinafter El Said,
The Morning After].
207. Malpani, supra note 196, at 28.
208. El Said, The Morning After, supra note 206, at 89.
209. Malpani, supra note 196, at 2.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Ryan Abbott & Ibrahim Alabbadi, The Price of Medicines in Jordan: The
Cost of Trade-Based Intellectual Property, 9 J. GENERIC MED. 75, 79 (2012).
213. Id. at 81.
214. Id. at 82.
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between the European Union and Canada will result in the rise of
medicines prices by “[c]ommitting Canada to creating a new system
of patent term restoration thereby delaying entry of generic
medicines by a period up to two years.”215 This will also reaffirm
Canada’s current term of data protection, and will create additional
barriers for future governments in case they decided to change the
system nationally (which is of course the same danger applying to all
countries accepting TRIPS-Plus obligations through international
agreements).216 Strikingly, “CETA will only affect intellectual
property rights in Canada—not the EU,” as the latter already applies
most of the agreement’s standards. “This analysis estimates that
CETA’s provisions will increase Canadian drug costs by between
6.2% and 12.9% starting in 2023.”217 In attempting to reduce the
impact, the “Canadian government committed to compensating
provinces for the rise in costs for their public drug plans.”218 The
analysis projected that CETA would delay the generics entry by 3.46
years on average and the annual loss for each additional year would
be $811 million, which leads to another burden cost of $2.8 billion
per year.219
In the highly ongoing controversial negotiations of the TPP, the
United States has proposed expanded patent protections standards
that will likely impact the affordability and accessibility of medicines
in all TPP partners.220 Further extension of protection to biological
products which include vaccines, blood and blood components, and
215. Joel Lexchin & Marc-André Gagnon, CETA and Pharmaceuticals: Impact
of the Trade Agreement Between Europe and Canada on the Costs of Prescription
Drugs, 10 GLOBALIZATION & HEALTH, no. 30, 2014.
216. Id. (“The agreement will also include a new right of appeal under the
patent linkage system that will create further delays for the entry of generics.”).
217. Id.
218. Id. (“[T]his means that people paying out-of-pocket for their drugs or
receiving them through private insurance, will be charged twice: once through
higher drug costs and once more through their federal taxes.”).
219. Id. at 4; see also PAUL GROOTENDORST & AIDAN HOLLIS, THE CANADAEUROPEAN UNION COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC & TRADE AGREEMENT: AN
ECONOMIC IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF PROPOSED PHARMACEUTICAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY PROVISIONS 23 (2011).
220. See generally Michael Blakeney, Scope of the Intellectual Property
Chapter of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA), 21 INT’L TRADE L.
& REG. 14 (2015) (comparing the terms of the TPP draft intellectual property
chapter to current norms).
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gene therapies in addition to other forms of protection is also
proposed under the TPP.221 Fears about the impact on poorer
countries of the TPP are mounting. In this regard, Vietnam has the
lowest GDP per capita of the twelve countries participating in the
TPP negotiations.222 One study analysed the potential impact of the
proposed patent regime under the TPP on access to ARVs in
Vietnam and found that “82% of the HIV population eligible for
treatment would receive ARVs” if the country utilised the TRIPS
flexibilities, “while only 30% of Vietnam’s eligible HIV patients
would have access to ARVs under the US 2014 TPP proposals –
more than halving the proportion treated compared to the current
68%” receiving treatment.223 Similar price impacts can be expected
for other countries participating in the TPP, though these are less
economically vulnerable than Vietnam.224
Moreover, a perspective study by E.U.–Colombia FTA IFARMA
commissioned by Health Action International Europe found that by
2030, patent-term extensions could increase expenditure on
medicines in Colombia by nearly $280 million; data-exclusivity rules
could result in an increase of more than $340 million.225 Another
221. See Trans-Pacific Partnership: Curbing Access to Medicines Now and in
the Future, amfAR (May 8, 2015), http://www.amfar.org/uploadedFiles/
_amfarorg/Articles/On_The_Hill/2015/IB_TPP_Brief_RC_050615.pdf
(raising
concern that the agreement could “undermine the entrance of generic biologics into
the market—including future vaccines”); see also Heesob Nam, US Ambassador
Confirmed Patent Linkage Under Korea-US FTA Includes Biologics – and US
Seeks
the
Same
in
TPP,
INFOJUSTICE.ORG
(Mar.
11,
2015),
http://infojustice.org/archives/34087.
222. See BROCK R. WILLIAMS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42344, TRANSPACIFIC PARTNERSHIP (TPP) COUNTRIES: COMPARATIVE TRADE AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 4 (2013) (noting Vietnam has a per capita GDP of just over $3,500,
compared to $60,000 in Singapore).
223. Moir et al., supra note 118, at 1.
224. Id. at 25-26 (“[I]f Vietnam were able to use full TRIPS flexibilities, and
obtain ARVs at world-best prices, then the proportion of the population who meet
the treatment criteria and receive ARV treatment with the available budget would
increase to 82%. Equally however, should Vietnam implement the further
reductions in patent quality and extend originator monopolies as proposed in the
TPPA, then prices could rise substantially. We have estimated a price increase to
$501, in which case, given the budget constraint, treatment would fall to 30% of
the eligible population. This is less than half of the population currently being
treated—over 45,000 people would no longer receive treatment.”).
225. IFARMA, IMPACT OF THE EU-ANDEAN TRADE AGREEMENT ON ACCESS TO
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cited the effects of the first decade of data exclusivity protection
between 2003 and 2011 to cost the public health system
approximately $1.3 million “on drugs protected with data
exclusivity.”226 When compared with the cost of the same drugs
under competitive market conditions, it is estimated that data
exclusivity cost the healthcare system nearly $400 million dollars
during that period.227 A sum which would have allowed the state to
cover the annual health insurance costs of about 146,000 Columbian
citizens.228 A similar 2009 study for the Dominican Republic
predicted a modest price increase of 9% to 15% for active
ingredients by 2027.229 It found that the strongest impact by far was
to be expected from provisions on data exclusivity.230 A perspective
study on the impact of the U.S.-Thailand FTA University of
Bangkok adopting a macro-economic model measuring the impact of
data exclusivity and patent extension proposals forecasted that all
scenarios demonstrated a negative impact on the pharmaceutical
market and access to medicines.231 Medicines prices would increase
MEDICINES IN COLOMBIA (2009) (“[P]rospective impacts of the EU–Peru FTA,
assessed using the same methodology, are similar to findings in Colombia. These
studies were commissioned during the EU–Andean community trade negotiations.
After objections by an alliance of Latin American and European civil society
groups, and the governments of the countries in question, TRIPS-plus rules have
been somewhat modified to reduce public health impacts on negotiating
partners.”).
226. César Rodriguez-Garavito, A Golden Straitjacket? The Struggle over
Patents and Access to Medicines in Colombia, in BALANCING WEALTH AND
HEALTH: THE BATTLE OVER INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES
IN LATIN AMERICA 169, 185 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & César Rodríguez-Garavito
eds., 2014).
227. Id. at 185.
228. MIGUEL ERNESTO CORTÉS GAMBA ET AL., IMPACTO DE 10 AÑOS DE
PROTECCIÓN DE DATOS EN MEDICAMENTOS EN COLOMBIA 9 (2012).
229. MAGDALENA RATHE ET AL., MEDICAMENTOS Y PROPIEDAD INTELECTUAL,
EVALUCIÓN DEL IMPACTO DE LOS NUEVOS ESTÁNDARES DE DERECHOS DE
PROPIEDAD INTELECTUAL EN EL PRECIO DE LOS MEDICAMENTOS: EL CASO DE LA
REPÚBLICA DOMINICANA v (2009).
230. Id. at 62 (finding that data exclusivity is the principal cause of the increase
in price of pharmaceuticals in the Dominican Republic due to the FTA).
231. Nusaraporn Kessomboon et al., Impact on Access to Medicines from TripsPlus: A Case Study of Thai-US FTA, 41 SOUTHEAST ASIAN J. TROPICAL MED. &
PUB. HEALTH 667, 674 (2010) (alleging that from 2008 to 2023 the impact of data
exclusivity provisions on pharmaceutical expenditures would amount to $3,713
million and that of patent extensions would be $4,049 million).
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by 32% and the domestic pharmaceutical market would contract by
$3.3 million by 2027.232
Finally, Australia also was not immune from the negative impact
of TRIPS-Plus rules arising from its FTA with the United States.233 A
study found:
At the time that the EOT [extension of the term] was introduced, the
annual cost to the Pharmaceutical Benefit Scheme (PBS) was estimated to
grow from $6 million in 2001-02 to $160 million in 2005-06. This cost
arises because there is a delayed entry to the PBS of cheaper generic
drugs. The estimate for 2012-13 is around $240 million in the medium
term and, in today’s dollars, around $480 million in the longer term. The
total cost of the EOT to Australia is actually about 20 per cent more than
this, because the PBS is only one source of revenue for the industry.234

There have been many calls upon developing countries to refrain
from introducing TRIPS-Plus commitments under their national law.
Most recently, the World Medical Association’s Council passed a
Resolution in its 200th session in April 2015.235 The Resolution
makes a number of recommendations for countries particularly to:
Oppose any trade agreement provisions that would compromise
access to health care services or medicines including but not limited
to:
- Patenting (or patent enforcement) of diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical
techniques;
- “Evergreening,” or patent protection for minor modifications of existing
drugs;
- Patent linkage or other patent term adjustments that serve to as a barrier
to generic entry into the market;
- Data exclusivity for biologics;
- Any effort to undermine TRIPS safeguards or restrict TRIPS flexibilities
including compulsory licensing;

232. Id. at 667.
233. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 9, at vi (noting that as a result of signing the
Australia-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Australia extended pharmaceutical patent
protection beyond the existing twenty year period).
234. Id. at vii-viii.
235. WMA Council Resolution on Trade Agreements and Public Health,
WORLD MED. ASS’N (Apr. 2015), http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/
10policies/30council/cr_20/.
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- Limits on clinical trial data transparency236

VI. CURBING TRIPS-PLUS THROUGH NATIONAL
POLICIES AND PROGRAMMES
There is now a wealth of evidence widely available about the
negative impact arising from various TRIPS-Plus obligations
compared to just few years ago. There has been much less study,
however, about the actual implementation of TRIPS-Plus obligations
under the national law of those countries which undertook such
commitments (from both developing and developed countries).237
The legal recommendation that developing and least developed
countries should in fact resist the acceptance and incorporation of
TRIPS-Plus obligations under their national legal frameworks
remains valid. Both developing and developed countries have in fact
attempted to curb and limit the negative impact of TRIPS-Plus rules
through creative legal and institutional implementation under their
national regime.
One important point to stress is the realization that the successful
implementation at the national level of polices curtailing TRIPS-Plus
obligations will not take place automatically. In other words, there
will have to be a concerted national meaningful effort and holistic
approach (preferably a national programme or policy) whose main
goal is to ensure collaboration between all concerned stakeholders in
order to achieve that objective. It is also important to think outside
the intellectual property box when such initiatives are adopted by
also looking at competition law for example.
Although TRIPS-Plus rules may have negative impacts, few
attempted to see how many countries transposed these TRIPS-Plus
rules under their national law in a manner which may curtail their
negative effect. This part will attempt to provide a number of
examples where countries have succeeded in limiting the negative
impact of TRIPS-Plus obligations during the implementation phase
in their national intellectual property regimes.
Chile provides an interesting example of a developing country that
attempted to limit the impact of TRIPS-Plus commitments under its
236. Id.
237. DEERE, supra note 18, at 21.
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national law arising from the signed FTA with the United States in
2006.238 After the agreement signing, public debate about the
negative impact arose.239 One area of concern was related to data
exclusivity and patent linkage, which were incorporated under the
FTA.240 For instance, María Angélica Sánchez of the Industrial
Association of Pharmaceutical Laboratories argued:
[I]f our already robust present legislation is expanded to establish socalled linkage, and is modified to include the protection of clinical trial
data, we must be prepared as a country for prices of medications to
increase considerably. In accordance with the last study undertaken by the
School of Economics at the University of Chile, prices will increase by 75
percent, which will have a considerable influence on the treatment of
illnesses under the AUGE [Chile’s Universal Access Plan] and other
common illnesses in the country.241

In dealing with the situation and following extensive public
debate, Chile limited the availability of data protection under its
national law to those pharmaceutical products that have been
marketed in the national territory in the year after the grant of
marketing approval and therefore if the drug was not marketed
within a year, the test data submitted for approval purposes will not
be protected.242 The rationale behind such a requirement is to
encourage early registration of drugs after first registration abroad, so
that the period of protection for the pharmaceutical test data starts
early.243 In addition, the law excluded several elements from the
238. Salvador Millaleo H., Chile: The Case of IP Opposition from
Predominantly Private Interests, in BALANCING WEALTH AND HEALTH: THE
BATTLE OVER INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES IN LATIN
AMERICA (Rochelle Dreyfuss & César Rodríguez-Garavit eds., 2014).
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Law No. 19,039 art. 90, septiembre 30, 1991, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.]
(Chile) (modified on December 1, 2005 by Law 19,996, which classifies active
ingredients as new chemical entities if they have not been marketed in the country
prior to the health registration or authorization application); accord Biadgleng &
Maur, supra note 185, at 20 (observing that El Salvador, the Dominican Republic,
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua appear to have introduced similar
legislation).
243. See, e.g., Law of Ukraine On Medicines, Implemented by Verhovna Rada
Resolution No. 124/96-BP, art. 9, Mar. 4, 1996 (Ukr.) (mandating that
pharmaceutical companies seeking data exclusivity submit an application for
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scope of protection. Accordingly, article 91 of the Chilean law states:
The protection of this Paragraph shall not apply when:
(a) The owner of the test data referred to in Article 89 has engaged in
forms of conduct or practices declared as contrary to free competition in
direct relation to the use or exploitation of that information, according to
the final decision of the free competition court.
(b) For reasons of public health, national security, non-commercial public
use, national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency
declared by the competent authority, ending the protection referred to in
Article 89 shall be justified.
(c) The pharmaceutical or chemical-agricultural product is the subject of a
compulsory license, according to what is established in this Law.
(d) The pharmaceutical or chemical-agricultural product has not been
marketed in the national territory after 12 months from the health
certificate or clearance granted in Chile.
(e) The pharmaceutical or chemical-agricultural product has a health
certificate or clearance abroad that has been in force for over 12
months.244

Although the negative impact of data exclusivity is not totally
eradicated as a result of the introduction of these provisions, one can
argue that the creative implementation approach taken by Chilean
legislature has in fact considerably limited the negative impact of
such provisions.245
Peru provides another example of a developing country in this
context. Its Legislative Decree No. 1072 for the Protection of
Undisclosed Test Data or Other Undisclosed Data Related to
Pharmaceutical Products implemented some flexibility by broadly
medicine registration within two years after the first registration of the medicine
anywhere in the world in order to encourage companies to launch medicines in
Ukraine as soon as possible).
244. See Pedro Roffe, Intellectual Property Provisions in Bilateral and Regional
Trade Agreements: The Challenges of Implementation 15 (Oct. 6, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Center for International Environmental
Law) (citing Decree No. 153 art. 91, Mechanisms for the Protection of
Undisclosed Data, Julio 20, 2005, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile)).
245. Millaleo H., supra note 238, at 151 (“However, the text of the FTA and
Law No. 20.160 did not speak to either issue. The text of the FTA section
regarding patents and medical products omitted several other topics of interest to
the United States, such as procedural issues, the question of parallel importation,
and the availability of second-use patents.”).

422

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[31:3

providing a definition of the concept of “new chemical entities” in
great detail, which could potentially provide more policy space when
interpreted.246 Moreover, the Decree provides that in cases where the
submission of undisclosed test data is “necessary to determine the
safety and efficiency of such product,” the authorities will protect
such data if “generating it has involved considerable efforts.”247
Other modifications introduced in 2009 also provide some policy
space to be interpreted under the public health approach.248 The
Decree further allows the five-year term of data exclusivity
protection to start concurrently from the date the product is approved
in other countries with high sanitary monitoring or approval
regime.249
Regarding the issue of patent linkage, Colombia implemented the
FTA with the United States creatively by requiring Invima (the
agency responsible for evaluating drug safety and efficacy) to keep a
public record of new applications rather than proactively warning
patent holders of applications that may impinge on their rights.250
Other developed countries are also exercising caution when it comes
to dealing with TRIPS-Plus conditions under their national
legislations. Two developed countries stand out in this regard:
Canada and Australia.
Canada has been active in perusing an international TRIPS-Plus
agenda through its participation in a number of international TRIPSPlus arrangements including the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement, TPP, and the bilateral agreement with the European
Union.251 However, national debate about the need to cater to the
health of citizens has concurrently taken the centre stage. For
246. See Legislative Decree No. 1072, modified by Law No. 29316, enero 14,
2009, art. 2 (Peru) (defining “new chemical entity” and providing guidance on
what will not be considered a new chemical entity).
247. Id. art. 1.
248. See id. art. 4 (dictating exceptions and limits to the right to protection of
data on the grounds of protecting public health).
249. See id. art. 3.
250. See the Decree 733 of 2012. For more on implementation by Columbia of
its FTA see César Rodríguez-Garavito, A Golden Straitjacket? The Struggle over
Patents and Access to Medicines in Colombia, in BALANCING WEALTH AND
HEALTH: THE BATTLE OVER INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES
IN LATIN AMERICA (Rochelle Dreyfuss & César Rodríguez-Garavit (eds) (2014).
251. Roffe, supra note 244.
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instance, the Commission on the Future of Health Care established
by the Prime Minister in 2002 highlighted its concern about the
practice of evergreening stating that it “delays the ability of generic
manufacturers to develop cheaper products for the marketplace and it
is a questionable outcome of Canada’s patent law.”252
The country had taken some measures to limit evergreening even
before the Commission issued its report. In 1993, the country
introduced the Notice of Compliance Regulations (“NOC”).253
According to the NOC, the Minister of Health has to keep a Patent
Register which contains the patents informed by innovator
companies in respect of drugs for which marketing approval is
sought.254 In 2006, in an attempt to “strike a balance between
effective protection of pharmaceuticals inventions, in order to
stimulate research and development (R&D), and keeping the costs of
medicines down,” the government adopted measures aimed at
preventing the use of evergreening patents.255 The new NOC,
therefore, prevents an innovator company from obtaining an order to
prohibit the registration of a generic product for a period of twentyfour months as otherwise allowed by the Canadian regulations, for
patents listed after a generic company submits an application for
approval of its product.256 The new regulations also make it clear that
patents covering matters without direct therapeutic application, such
as processes or intermediates, cannot be used to delay the marketing
approval of generics.257
The Canadian judiciary also showed concern about the
proliferation of patents in a number of decisions. In AstraZeneca
252. ROY J. ROMANOW, COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF HEALTH CARE IN
CANADA, BUILDING ON VALUES: THE FUTURE OF HEALTH CARE IN CANADA 209
(2002).
253. See Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations (Patent Act),
SOR/93-133 (Can.).
254. See Donald M. Cameron et al., Canadian Drug Patent Laws and
Regulations, in CAMERON’S PATENT AND TRADE SECRETS LAW 9 (Donald M.
Cameron ed., 2010), http://www.jurisdiction.com/patweb09.pdf.
255. DOMINIQUE VALIQUET, LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT, PRB 06-14E, THE
PATENTED MEDICINES (NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE) REGULATIONS 1 (2006); see
Regulations Amending the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance)
Regulations, C. Gaz. Part II, Vol. 140, No. 21, 1503-25 (Can.).
256. Cameron et al., supra note 254, at 9.
257. Id. at 13-15.
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Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health),258 the Supreme Court of
Canada acknowledged:
Given the evident (and entirely understandable) commercial strategy of
the innovative drug companies to evergreen their products by adding bells
and whistles to a pioneering product even after the original patent for that
pioneering product has expired, the decision of the Federal Court of
Appeal would reward evergreening even if the generic manufacturer (and
thus the public) does not thereby derive any benefit from the subsequently
listed patents.259

Moreover, various Canadian courts started to apply a judicial
interpretation to the utility requirement. This has led to the
invalidation of a number of pharmaceutical patents in the country. As
Ho explains:
[I]f a patent or patent application “promises” a certain result, such as
fewer side effects, evidence of that promise, such as data establishing
fewer side effects, must be disclosed or “soundly predicted” in the patent
to satisfy utility pursuant to the “promise doctrine.” If there is no promise,
only a scintilla of utility is required.260

Although the Canadian approach to interpreting what is “useful”
differs from other countries’ interpretation, it is widely
acknowledged that a patent should only be granted when the inventor
has provided enough benefit to society.261 Interestingly, the first
Supreme Court of Canada case to apply this doctrine did so in the
258. 2006 SCC 49 (Can.).
259. Id. para. 39; see also Apotex Inc. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc., 2008
SCC 61, paras. 97-98 (Can.) (conveying concern over the use of evergreening for
the extension of data exclusivity periods but claiming that the concern over
evergreening is an insufficient basis for attacking the selection of patents doctrine).
See generally Correa, Guidelines, supra note 36, at 9, 16 (describing specific
mechanisms that enable the evergreening of pharmaceutical patents, such as
patents on salts and the exploitation of enantiomers).
260. Ho, supra note 42, at 328-29.
261. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 535 (1966) (“[T]he decisions of the
[Court of Customs and Patent Appeals] are in accord with the view that a product
may not be patented absent a showing of utility . . . .”); cf. John Lechleiter, How
Lax Patent Rules in Canada are Suffocating Life-Saving Innovation, FORBES (Aug.
26, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnlechleiter/2013/08/26/how-lax-patentrules-in-canada-are-suffocating-life-saving-innovation/#5b8c11dc4dff (critiquing
the “Promise of the Patent Doctrine” as arbitrary and detrimental to the Canadian
biopharmaceutical industry).
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context of an invention on a new use of a known compound—the use
of AZT to treat HIV/AIDS.262 This is a case that might have been
barred at a much earlier stage with less cost to society by adopting a
model similar to India’s section 3(d) statute, which prohibits not only
new variations without increased efficacy, but new uses.263
Perhaps there is no other developed country which went as far as
Australia in attempting to deal with the negative impact of TRIPSPlus rules. Having seen its public health situation negatively
implicated by the signing of the FTA with the United States,
discussion ensued nationally about the need to curtail the negative
impact arising from the FTA.264 A 2013 report summarizes the
current challenges facing the regime in the country by stating:
Australia’s patent system has allowed and will continue for some time to
allow patents to be granted which would not be granted elsewhere; it has
awarded a longer effective patent life than is provided in the United States
or than seems necessary to underpin drug development in Australia; it has
allowed patents to expire later in Australia than in its major trading
partners. All of this has limited the generic manufacturing base,
employment and exports and it has increased Australia’s pharmaceutical
costs. The Raising the Bar Act which recently came into force may
moderate this, but its efficacy will not be evident for some years, and
there is the prospect that, even with the changes introduced by Raising the
Bar, patent standards are still insufficient to moderate evergreening in the
pharmaceutical industry.265

Nevertheless and following the signing of the FTA with the United
States in 2006, Australia introduced a number of reforms aimed
primarily towards limiting the impact of TRIPS-Plus commitments
arising from the FTA.266 For instance, the FTA included obligations
related to the extension of patent duration to compensate delays
during marketing approval.267 During the implementation phase, the
262. See Apotex Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation Ltd., 2002 SCC 77, paras. 77,
80-83 (Can.).
263. See Chatterjee, Novartis, supra note 169.
264. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 9, at 120-21.
265. Id. at xiv.
266. Id. at 118.
267. See Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, Austl.-U.S., art.
17.9.8(b), May 18, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 1248 [hereinafter Austl.-U.S. FTA] (“[E]ach
Party shall make available an adjustment of the patent term to compensate the
patent owner for unreasonable curtailment of the effective patent term as a result of
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country limited the negative impact arising from patent term
extension by further confining such type of extensions to certain and
specific categories of products.268 Moreover, the Australian patent
law imposes additional substantive conditions specifically applicable
for the extension of patent duration for “pharmaceutical
substances.”269 Based on this, the extension of the term is possible
only if the following conditions are met:
i) the patent claim contains at least one “pharmaceutical substance per
se”;
ii) that the product is included in the Australian Register of Therapeutic
Goods; and
iii) marketing approval was issued less than five years after the filing of
the patent.270

Moreover and in order to widen the available national policy
space, the 1990 Patents Act also includes dedicated procedures for
the opposition against patent term extension.271 In addition to these
measures, the 1990 Patents Act imposes additional limitations on
patent rights during the extended period of protection. For instance,
article 78 states:
If the Commissioner grants an extension of the term of a standard patent,
the exclusive rights of the patentee during the term of the extension are
not infringed:
(a) by a person exploiting:
(i) a pharmaceutical substance per se that is in substance disclosed in
the complete specification of the patent and in substance falls within
the scope of the claim or claims of that specification; or
(ii) a pharmaceutical substance when produced by a process that
involves the use of recombinant DNA technology, that is in substance

the marketing approval process.”).
268. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 9, at ix, 93-97 (indicating that unlike the
United States, Europe, United Kingdom, and Japan, Australia limits extensions
only to patents claiming new active ingredients or formulation).
269. Id. at 40, 101.
270. See Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ch 6 pt 3 s 70 sub-divs (2)-(3) (Austl.).
271. See id. s 75 sub-divs (1)-(4); see also Austl.-U.S. FTA, supra note 267, art.
17.9.8(b) n.17-50 (declaring that the term “pharmaceutical substance” is
synonymous to “pharmaceutical product,” thereby allowing Australia to preserve
its rules on eligibility for extension of patent terms to compensate for delays in the
marketing authorization process).
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disclosed in the complete specification of the patent and in substance
falls within the scope of the claim or claims of that specification; for a
purpose other than therapeutic use; or
(b) by a person exploiting any form of the invention other than:
(i) a pharmaceutical substance per se that is in substance disclosed in
the complete specification of the patent and in substance falls within
the scope of the claim or claims of that specification; or
(ii) a pharmaceutical substance when produced by a process that
involves the use of recombinant DNA technology, that is in substance
disclosed in the complete specification of the patent and in substance
falls within the scope of the claim or claims of that specification.272

Despite the above measures, some argue that the government did
not go far enough in limiting the negative impact arising from
TRIPS-Plus rules.273 The 2013 Pharmaceutical Patents Review
Report further recommends that there is a “need for an external body,
the Patent Oversight Committee, to audit the patent grant processes
to help ensure these new standards are achieved, and to monitor
whether they inhibit the patenting of follow-on pharmaceuticals
which promote evergreening with no material therapeutic benefit.”274
In addition, it stated that “[t]he Government should also review the
effectiveness of the patent scheme when the impact of Raising the
Bar Act has become clear.”275 Moreover, one of the report’s authors
went as far as recommending the shortening of the patent life from
fifteen years to twelve years.276 According to the author, the
estimated savings resulting from this reduction is $130 million a
year.277 Furthermore, “if a 70% price reduction from generic entry
was achieved as discussed above, the savings would be
approximately $260 million a year.”278
In supplementing the legislative framework, the Australian Patent
Office also became more assertive in rejecting requests/applications
to extend the duration of patent protection in cases where it
determined that the innovation in the patent claim did not involve the
pharmaceutical substance per se, including the claims where the
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Patents Act 1990, ch 6 pt 3 s 78.
See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 9, at 119.
Id. at xi.
Id.
Id. at xv, 84.
Id. at 84-85.
Id. at 85.
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patent was primarily related to the arrangement of pharmaceutical
substances; a new method of delivery of a known substance or to the
use or method of producing a substance.279
It is worth noting that the above referred to examples do not
emanate from separate national initiatives but rather as a part of a
more comprehensive approach dealing with public health challenges
within these countries. This demonstrates that many developed
countries acknowledge today the negative consequences to TRIPSPlus rules on public health. At the same time, few developing
countries seem to take serious notice of such implications.
Needless to say that there are other approaches currently being
utilised by developed countries in their fight against evergreening
and patent proliferation. One of these being considered by the
European Patent Office (“EPO”) is increasing the fees paid for
examination and maintenance of patents.280 Some believe that this
approach would “reduce ‘strategic behaviour’ and the number of
claims and thereby improve ‘patent quality’, particularly with regard
to patent ‘thickets’.”281 Ecuador is an example of a developing
country that has implemented a fee increase policy.282 “Examination
and registration fees, as well as maintenance fees for patents were
drastically increased recently, elevating the cost of obtaining a patent
to more than U$S [sic] 100,000, except for certain categories of
applicants (such as small companies and universities).”283 As Correa
explains, “[t]hese fees – probably the highest in the world – are

279. See id. at 100-01.
280. See Yvonne Johnson, European Patent Fees to Increase, BAKER
BRETTELL (Jan. 10, 2014), http://barkerbrettell.co.uk/european-patent-fees-toincrease/; cf. EUR. PATENT OFFICE ECON. & SCI. ADVISORY BD.,
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING THE PATENT SYSTEM 4 (2012) (noting that
while the Economic & Science Advisory Board does not recommend an overhaul
of the patent fee system, it does recommend the adoption of more “consistent and
harmonized fee policies . . . .”).
281. Correa, Tackling, supra note 177, at 21 (citing EUR. PATENT OFFICE ECON.
& SCI. ADVISORY BD., WORKSHOP ON PATENT THICKETS 12, 16 (2012)); see also
EUR. PATENT OFFICE ECON. & SCI. ADVISORY BD., supra note 280, at 5
(explaining that patent thickets refers to a high concentration of patents in a
particular area, especially those with high market potential).
282. Correa, Tackling, supra note 177, at 21.
283. Id. (citing Resolucíon No. 001-2013 CD-IEPI).
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likely to substantially reduce the number of patent applications.”284
Another approach is related to the adoption of opposition
procedures. Oppositions to pharmaceutical patents are much more
frequently filed and granted than other types of patents in many
countries. Emerging evidence estimates that at least 27% of current
patents would be found invalid by U.S. courts285 while in only thirtynine out of 283 cases—where patent validity was questioned before a
U.S. Federal District Court between 2007 and 2011—the claims that
were challenged were found to be valid and enforceable.286 Other
studies indicate that “[w]hen generic competitors challenge . . .
patents, courts find many invalid or not infringed.”287 Studies
concerning the United States and the European Union found that
generic companies win nearly three-quarters of cases.288 In the
European Union and according to the EPO, patents on medicines
were twice as likely to be challenged as other types of patents.289 In
284. Id.
285. See Shawn P. Miller, Where’s The Innovation?: An Analysis of the
Quantity and Qualities of Anticipated and Obvious Patents 2 (Feb. 10, 2012)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with George Mason University, Department of
Economics).
286. Robert Smyth, White Paper Report: United States Patent Invalidity Study
2012 2 (Sept. 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Morgan Lewis); see,
e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing In re
Corkill, 771 F.2d 1496, 1500 (Fed. Cir. 1985)) (finding invalid a patent on
amlodipine besylate on grounds that unpredictability cannot be equated to
patentability, and that “obviousness cannot be avoided simply by showing of some
degree of unpredictability in the art so long as there was a reasonable probability of
success”).
287. Ho, supra note 42, at 321.
288. See id.; see also FED TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO
PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY vi (2002) (finding that generic companies
win in 73% of challenges, with 28% of patents found invalid, 35% of the cases
finding lack of infringement, and 10% of cases abandoned by the patent owner
before a judicial finding); Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry, Preliminary Report 18889 (Nov. 28, 2008) (working paper) (on file with the Eur. Comm’n) (noting that
generic companies won more than 60% of all cases, 71% of challenges they
initiated, and 74% cases involving secondary patents). But see W. Raghupathi,
Pharmaceutical Patent Validity: An Empirical Study of the Recent Decisions of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (2008-2011) 20 (2011) (working
paper) (on file with Fordham University) (“The current study finds the net ruling
of the Federal Circuit to be balanced and nuanced with a nearly equal number of
affirmations and reversals, among both valid and invalid patents.”).
289. See Correa, Tackling, supra note 177, at 10.
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Argentina, it was found that twenty-five patent oppositions were
submitted by domestic companies including for the HIV medicines
efavirenz, ritonavir, lopinavir, raltegravir, elvitegravir, and the fixeddose combination TDF/FTC/EFV which led to the rejection of many
opposed patent applications.290 In India, twenty-five out of thirty-four
oppositions (73.5%) that were filed by local companies or nongovernmental organizations against pharmaceutical patent
applications filed between 2005 and 2008 resulted in rejections.291
Driven by these considerations, the America Invents Act that
amended in 2011 the U.S. Patent Act aimed, inter alia, to boost the
use of such procedures.292 Among other changes, the United States
Trademark and Patent Office Director can now institute reexamination on his own initiative on the basis of prior art cited
during another re-examination.293 A new proceeding, called “post
grant review,” was also “introduced to allow more broadly based
challenges to a patent during . . . the nine months after grant or
reissue.”294 The aim of these procedures is to be quick, less costly,
and use more technically trained adjudicators than the U.S. federal
court system. In addition, in order to encourage applications for
invalidity, U.S. law awards the first generic company to successfully
challenge a patent on a drug the right to enjoy a 180-day exclusivity
period in which no subsequent abbreviated new drug application can
be approved for that drug.295
290. See New Resources from Argentina Now Available on PODB, PAT.
OPPOSITION DATABASE (May 17, 2013), http://news.patentoppositions.org/
post/50651291488/new-resources-from-argentina-now-available-on-podb.
291. See Shamnad Basheer, Patent Oppositions in India: The “Efficacy” of
Section 3(d), SPICY IP (Sept. 16, 2009), http://spicyip.com/2009/09/patentoppositions-in-india-efficacy-of.html (finding that approximately twenty out of the
twenty-five rejections were based on section 3(d) of the Indian Patent Law,
indicating the “efficacy” of this controversial section).
292. See Post-Grant Proceedings Against U.S. Patents, LADAS & PARRY LLP,
http://ladas.com/education-center/post-grant-proceedings/ (last visited Feb. 27,
2016).
293. See id.
294. Id.
295. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(5)(B)(iv) (2012); see also Tony v. Pezzano, United
States: The Drug Approval Process: What’s the “Hatch” with the One Hundred
Eighty-Day ANDA Exclusivity Period?, MONDAQ (June 8, 2001),
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/24779/Life+Sciences+Biotechnology/The
+Drug+Approval+Process+Whats+The+Hatch+With+The+One+Hundred+Eighty

2016]

TRIPS-PLUS

431

Needless to say that the role of judiciary is also essential in
restoring the balance. As Okediji explains, “[t]he U.S. Supreme
Court has creatively interpreted important policy bases for limiting
patent subject matter eligibility in controversial cases involving new
technologies.”296 An example of a developing country’s judicial
involvement can be seen in the Kenyan High Court’s decision in
Asero Ochieng v. Attorney-General,297 which overturned an anticounterfeiting statute (The Anti-Counterfeit Act, No. 13 (2008)).
This court’s decision, which preserved access to generic medicines,
found the Act to be unconstitutional because it undermined the
fundamental human right to health.298
Institutional creativity also plays an important role in preserving
the flexibilities of TRIPS, limiting the negative impact of TRIPSPlus rules and enhancing access to medicines. The widely cited
Brazilian practice (prior consent) takes the lead in this regard.299
Since 1999, applications for pharmaceutical patents must obtain the
prior consent from the Brazilian National Sanitary Agency (Agência
Nacional de Vigilância Sanitária, “ANVISA”).300 In accordance with
Day+ANDA+Exclusivity+Period.
296. Okediji, supra note 14, at 18 (citing Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1301 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S.
593, 606 (2010)).
297. (2012) Petition No. 409 of 2009 (H.C.K.) (Kenya).
298. See The Anti-Counterfeit Act, No. 13 (2008) KENYA GAZETTE
SUPPLEMENT NO. 97 §§ 32-34 (granting owners of intellectual property with
“reasonable cause to suspect” their right is being infringed the right to file a
complaint); see also Suleiman Mbatiah, Kenya: Pharmaceutical Companies
Pushing Anti-Counterfeit Law, INTER PRESS SERV. (June 14, 2010),
http://www.ipsnews.net/2010/06/kenya-pharmaceutical-companies-pushing-anticounterfeit-law/.
299. See CTR. FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES & DEBATES, supra note 7, at 134. See
generally Kenneth C. Shadlen, The Rise and Fall of “Prior Consent” in Brazil, 3
WIPO J. 103, 103 (2011) (examining the development of prior consent and the
conflicts surrounding its application).
300. CTR. FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES & DEBATES, supra note 7, at 130. It became
mandatory for pharmaceutical patent applications to undergo analysis by ANVISA
ever since the institution of Provisional Act 2006/1999, which created the prior
consent mechanism. Prior consent was consolidated by Law no. 10196, of 2001,
which amended article 229 of the Patent Act—including item C: Article 229-C,
Patent Act. The granting of patents for pharmaceutical products and processes shall
depend on the prior consent of the National Sanitary Agency—ANVISA.
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this, the national system in the country divides the examination of
pharmaceutical patent applications between two agencies: the
National Institute of Intellectual Property (“INPI”) and ANVISA.301
In accordance with this, the INPI is responsible for examining the
legal sufficiency of patent applications while ANVISA, is a separate
agency devoted to protecting and promoting “public health” in
Brazil.302 Under the prior consent law, INPI no longer has the
authority to grant patents on its own; before doing so, it should
forward the application to ANVISA for its consent (examination),
purportedly based on public health considerations.303 There is
evidence that such a practice has in fact improved the quality of the
granted patents in the country drastically.304 Through national
coordination between legislation, patent office action and judicial
intervention, the country provides valuable lessons to many
developing countries in the area of public health and access to
medicines.

VII. SUPPLEMENTARY MODELS FOR
INNOVATION IN PUBLIC HEALTH: PAY-FORPERFORMANCE SCHEMES
The preceding section emphasized the need for countries alike to
take a pro-active approach in interpreting intellectual property
commitments under their national laws in a manner which
maximizes the use of remaining policy space even where TRIPSPlus obligations exist. At the same time, there is a need for a broader
approach that goes beyond the parameters of the intellectual property
regime. Countries should also indulge and even encourage
experimentation with other polices and approaches which may also
301. See Shadlen, supra note 299, at 104-05.
302. Id.
303. See id. at 107.
304. ANVISA conducted a qualitative analysis of decisions issued after prior
approval from INPI between 2001 and 2009. The study showed that ANVISA’s
participation increases the quality of granted patents by preventing approval of
“inappropriate and frivolous patents.” The study found that, out of the 1,346 patent
applications analysed in the time period, 119 were denied consent. Of the patent
applications denied, 47.9% were denied for lack of novelty and 22.7% were denied
for obviousness. CTR. FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES & DEBATES, supra note 7, at 147.
India also provides an interesting case of a developing country in this field, see
Basheer, supra note 291.
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complement the intellectual property regime with the goal of driving
innovation and improving quality and coverage in the public health
sector.305 Adoption of new innovative models in the public health
sector is therefore a necessity to deal with the current and future
challenges facing humanity.306 This will require the combined efforts
of national governments, multi-national bodies, and the private
sector. This will also demand a vision orientation, where
“[c]ollaboration and partnership, then, may have to take the place of
profit and competition as the key words in the development of the
medicines of the future.”307
A number of global initiatives were launched in recent years308
including prizes for medical innovation, open source/access drug
initiatives,309 in addition to new access and innovation models such
as medicines patent pools,310 the health impact fund (“HIP”),311 “and
305. E.g., Paul Grootendorst et al., New Approaches to Rewarding
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 183 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 681, 681-85 (2011)
(analysing the limitations of the drug patent system and describing alternatives
such as public subsidies and funding for research, and impact-based and royaltybased reward systems).
306. See Jerome H. Reichman, Lecture, Nurturing a Transactional System of
Innovation, 16 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 143, 162 (2007) (arguing that
developing countries would benefit from “experimentally . . . testing different
approaches to stimulating and disseminating innovation in their national and
regional systems of innovation and to defining the relevant supporting legal
standards that could prove effective for different players at different levels of
development”).
307. Anderson, Pharmaceuticals, supra note 45.
308. See generally The Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health,
Innovation
and
Intellectual
Property,
WORLD
HEALTH
ORG.,
http://www.who.int/phi/implementation/phi_globstat_action/en/ (last visited Mar.
16, 2016) (announcing the WHO comprehensive Global Strategy and Plan of
Action on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property).
309. See, e.g., Christine Årdal & John-Arne Røttingen, An Open Source
Business Model for Malaria, PLOS ONE, no. 2, Feb. 6, 2015 (recommending the
“open source” approach to develop new drugs to fight malaria).
310. See, e.g., Patent Pools: Assessing Their Value-Added to Global Health,
Policy Brief, RESULTS FOR DEV. INST., http://healthresearchpolicy.org/sites/
healthresearchpolicy.org/files/assessments/files/Patent%20Pools%20-%20final
%20-%20Brief%2020120409.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2016) (assessing whether
patent pools work to speed development of new medicines in low to mid-income
countries).
311. See Amitava Banerjee et al., The Health Impact Fund: Incentives for
Improving Access to Medicines, 375 LANCET 166, 166 (2010) (proposing the
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‘open data pools and prize funds that have been created or
conceived’”.312 These schemes share one thing in common, dealing
with the challenge of lack of resources, incentives and funding while
at the same time improving the quality and coverage of public health
regime and access to medicines in any country.
Regional powers have also paid special attention to these
challenges.313 For example, the European Union declared its
commitment to explore alternative models and proposals in its
development, innovation and health policy objectives.314 In 2010, the
European Council released conclusions on an EU Role in Global
Health in response to proposals from the European Commission.315
As highlighted, this represents the first formal E.U. strategy of its
type, since previous European agreements on health issues focused
on more specific areas including AIDS and pandemic diseases.316
The 2010 E.U. Council Conclusions on Global Health pledged to
“ensure that innovations and interventions produce products and
services that are accessible and affordable.”317 The European Union’s
Health Impact Fund “as an enduring reform that would give pharmaceutical
innovators stable financial incentives to develop new medicines that have large
effects on global health, and to sell them worldwide at no more than the lowest
feasible cost of production and distribution”).
312. BLOEMEN ET AL., supra note 27, at 10. Alongside these initiatives there are
other proposals aimed towards making the pharmaceutical industry more
accountable and transparent. See Ed Silverman, Angry Over Drug Prices, More
States Push Bills for Pharma to Disclose Costs, WALL ST. J.: PHARMALOT (Apr.
24, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/pharmalot/2015/04/24/angryoverdrugpricesmorestatespushbillsforpharmatodisclosecosts/ (reporting on recent proposed state
legislation that require full disclosure of costs in order for pharmaceutical
companies to justify raising prices); Sam Stein, Elizabeth Warren Proposes Big
Pharma ‘Swear Jar’ to Fund Medical Research, HUFFINGTON POST: HUFFPOST
POL. (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/22/elizabethwarren-pharma_n_6520746.html (describing Senator Elizabeth Warren’s proposed
Medical Innovation Act that would require pharmaceutical companies to pay into a
fund when sanctioned by the federal government, which would be used to invest in
research for the National Institutes of Health and the FDA).
313. See, e.g., Press Release, Council of the European Union, Council
Conclusions on the EU Role in Global Health 1, 5 (May 10, 2010) (on file with the
European Commission).
314. See id. at 3.
315. Id.
316. See id. at 4.
317. Id. at 5; see BLOEMEN ET AL., supra note 27, at 11 (“These conclusions call
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2020 proposal, the Innovation Union,318 “speaks of introducing a
more ‘open approach to innovation’, ‘increased open access to the
results of EU financed research’ and the []promotion of ‘patent
pools’, as well as ‘innovation inducement prizes’.”319 The ensuing
part will focus specifically on performance-based rewards (“PBR”)
schemes. In the United States, the Senate asked the National
Academies in 2012 to consider alternative models based on the
notion of funding R&D though a combination of expanded
government grants and subsidies, and new innovation prize funds,
with the level of the R&D rewards based upon a percentage of GNP
or health care outlays.320

VIII. PERFORMANCE-BASED REWARDS
One of the promising approaches gaining ground in this field is
related to PBR or pay-for-performance for pharmaceutical
innovation schemes. “Pay-for-performance” is a wide term which
encompasses various schemes and programmes “aimed at improving
the quality, efficiency, reach and overall value and coverage of
health care.”321 These arrangements offer financial incentives to
various stakeholders and health care providers to carry out such
improvements and achieve optimal outcomes/objectives related to
for needs-driven innovation and further exploration of innovation ‘de-linkage
models.’”).
318. Innovation Union: A Europe 2020 Initiative, EUR. COMM’N,
http://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-union/index_en.cfm (last updated Oct. 13,
2015).
319. BLOEMEN ET AL., supra note 27, at 11; see Sophie Bloemen & David
Hammerstein, Time for the EU to Lead On Innovation: EU Policy Opportunities in
Biomedical Innovation and the Promotion of Public Knowledge Goods (Apr. 2012)
(policy paper) (on file with Health Action International Europe) (providing
descriptions of the policy proposals).
320. See S. 3187, 112th Cong. (2012).
321. Julia James, Pay-for-Performance: New Payment Systems Reward Doctors
and Hospitals for Improving Quality of Care, but Studies to Date Show Mixed
Results,
HEALTH
POL’Y
BRIEF,
Oct.
11,
2012,
at
1,
1.
http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_78.pdf; see
Pay for Performance – Models, HEALTH CARE INCENTIVES IMPROVEMENT INST.,
http://www.hci3.org/thought-leadership/why-incentives-matter/payperformance/pay-performance-models (last visited Mar. 16, 2016) (noting that
pay-for-performance models all include a performance measurement, incentive
design, and transparency and consumer engagement).
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the health of their patients which may not (either partially or fully)
have been undertaken otherwise.322 In a nutshell, pay-forperformance is “a set of performance indicators linked to an
incentive scheme.”323
Described by Nathan in 2007 as one of the most promising
systems in dealing with the problem of affordability and availability
of medicines, pay-for-performance schemes started to gain more
ground during the last decade.324 Put simply, PBR’s main objective is
to link payment to performance by measuring the effectiveness of
medicines through “Quality-Adjusted Life Year[s]” or QALYs.325 In
general, PBR covers various types of arrangements and schemes
under its umbrella including risk sharing schemes and patient access
schemes.326 Some of these schemes may reward good results by
giving a bonus for instance, or simply penalize failure to achieve the
agreed goals and objectives or cost savings in accordance with an
identified metric for assessing drug’s health impact and monitoring
improvement.327
Accordingly, “payment schemes are therefore used in an attempt
to influence the achievement of objectives such as quality, efficiency
322. See James, supra note 321, at 1-2 (outlining mixed results of pay-forperformance programs under the Affordable Care Act).
323. Gregory C. Pope, Overview of Pay for Performance Models and Issues, in
PAY FOR PERFORMANCE IN HEALTH CARE: METHODS AND APPROACHES 33, 33
(Jerry Cromwell et al. eds., 2011) (providing a detailed overview of the elements
and implementation of pay-for-performance programs).
324. Carl Nathan, Aligning Pharmaceutical Innovation with Medical Need, 13
NATURE MED. 304, 307 (2007).
325. See AIDAN HOLLIS & THOMAS POGGE, THE HEALTH IMPACT FUND:
MAKING NEW MEDICINES ACCESSIBLE FOR ALL 9 (2008) (explaining that “[a] drug
that extends a person’s life by ten healthy years would be credited with ten
QALYs” and describing the way that QALYs are assessed).
326. See Louis P. Garrison, Jr. et al., Performance-Based Risk-Sharing
Arrangements—Good Practices for Design, Implementation, and Evaluation:
Report of the ISPOR Good Practices for Performance-Based Risk-Sharing
Arrangements Task Force, 16 VALUE IN HEALTH 703, 704 (2013).
327. See 4 SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, SIDLEY GLOBAL PRICING NEWSLETTER 1-2
(2016) (describing an Australian reward-based scheme that determines the price
the government pays the drug manufacturer based on the benefit of the drug to
each individual patient); James, supra note 321 (providing an example of a penalty
used by Medicare, which no longer pays for preventable conditions, such as
urinary tract infections associated with catheter use, that develop during a hospital
stay).
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and cost control.”328 There have been a number of pay-forperformance schemes already adopted by a number of developed
countries including the United Kingdom and the United States.329 For
instance, in the United Kingdom, before 2003, hospitals were mainly
paid using a system of annual block contracts, with an agreed sum of
money for a given amount of activity.330 This changed in 2004,
where a new scheme was based “on practices rather than individual
GPs, and was funded out of a fixed national global sum for primary
medical care. It incorporated a voluntary pay-for-performance
component.”331 The UK’s General Medical Services Contract, for
example, rewards performance in accordance with a criteria based on
146 performance measures.332 More specifically designated schemes
are also gaining ground. More recently, the NHS in Scotland
announced a new scheme late 2014, whereby it could be reimbursed
for the cost of a new hepatitis drug if sufferers fail to clear the
virus.333 It was reported that the Scottish Medicines Consortium
(“SMC”) has approved the drug, whose generic name is Simeprevir,
for use within NHS Scotland.334 The “Pay If You Clear” scheme is
awaiting a formal decision by NHS Scotland.335
There are also a number of similar schemes currently in place in
the United States which even preceded those in the United
328. LOUISE MARSHALL ET AL., NUFFIELDTRUST, THE NHS PAYMENT SYSTEM:
EVOLVING POLICY AND EMERGING EVIDENCE 6 (2014).
329. See, e.g., Aaron E. Carroll, The Problem with ‘Pay for Performance’ in
Medicine, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/29/
upshot/the-problem-with-pay-for-performance-in-medicine.html.
330. See MARSHALL ET AL., supra note 328, at 3, 7 (explaining the benefits and
drawbacks of block budgets and the United Kingdom’s decision to move away
from them).
331. Id. at 14.
332. See Pope, supra note 323, at 41 (noting that the focus on physicians’
performance is important because they control most health care spending when
determining whether or not to authorize care).
333. Reevel Alderson, Unique “Pay if you Clear” Proposal for New Hepatitis
Drug, BBC NEWS (Oct. 13, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland29569242 (“The ‘Pay If You Clear’ scheme would come into effect if patients
treated with the drug do not become free of the hepatitis C virus (HCV) after 12
weeks.”).
334. See id.
335. Id. (“The novel proposal was revealed after the drug Olysio was cleared
for use by the SMC.”).
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Kingdom.336 James identified more than forty private sector schemes
which were already in place in 2012.337 She states that “[p]ay-forperformance has become popular among policy makers and private
and public payers, including Medicare and Medicaid.”338 The largest
of these schemes in the United States is the Premier Hospital Quality
Incentive Demonstration project.339 “From 2003 to 2009, CMS and
Premier, a nationwide hospital system, tested the extent to which
financial bonuses would improve the quality of care provided to
Medicare patients with certain conditions, including acute
myocardial infarction, heart failure, and pneumonia.”340 James
reports that “[t]he American Medical Association has developed
principles for pay-for-performance programs emphasizing that
provider participation should be voluntary; that physicians should be
allowed to review, comment, and appeal performance data; and that
programs should use new funding ‘for what’s next?’”.341 Pay-forperformance programs are likely to expand across U.S. health care in
the near future, especially with implementation of the Affordable
Care Act. More countries are also showing interest in such
schemes.342

IX. EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPACT
There is an agreement that the patent related challenges described
earlier in this article will not disappear over a night nor will the
current patent protection regime be able to steer innovation towards
solving the global health challenges. In fact, attempts to reform the
system have failed so far in bearing fruit. Having said that, many
patients’ lives in many parts of the world that do not have access to
336. See Marin Gemmill, Pay-for-Performance in the US: What Lessons for
Europe?, 13 EUROHEALTH, no. 4, 2007, at 21, 21-23 (2007) (adding that the
United Kingdom was the first out of all the European countries to use a pay-forperformance system).
337. James, supra note 321, at 2.
338. Id. at 1.
339. Id. at 2.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 5.
342. See, e.g., GILBERT’S LLP, TOWARD PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE:
REIMBURSEMENT OF INNOVATIVE NEW DRUGS 1 (2012) (arguing that there is a
renewed interest conditional reimbursement schemes by pointing to more recent
programs in Belgium and the Netherlands).
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medicines are being lost.343 Taking a pragmatic approach through
exploring available options which at the same time do not conflict
with the current patent system is badly needed.
In line with this, HIP enters the picture as a PBR scheme which
does not conflict with the intellectual property system but rather
coexist with its deficiencies.344 It offers producers an incentive to be
rewarded (through payment of a fixed amount of money each year,
divided among the registered medicines according to their respective
health impact) from public funds in addition to sales over a period of
time in proportion to the impact of their invention on health impact
or the global burden of disease against making the invention
available to others345 by giving pharmaceutical companies the option
of registering any new medicine, thereby agreeing to provide it at
cost anywhere it is needed.346
So if the problem is due to market size and purchasing powers for
the treatment of a neglected disease, HIP indirectly channels efforts
to deal with that by offering a reward, or say an early cashing in
mechanism. The HIP, however, does not focus on neglected diseases
only nor on developing countries, it rather creates a framework
which works globally and for other types of diseases including
communicable ones.347
343. See BAILEY ET AL., supra note 53, at 3 (disputing industrialized country
claims that patenting of medication is not a crucial health issue because it only
affects 5% of current WHO essential drugs by pointing out that it includes vital
and prohibitively expensive drugs such as anti-HIV/AIDS medicine); Sigrid
Sterckx, Patents and Access to Drugs in Developing Countries: An Ethical
Analysis, 4 DEV. WORLD BIOETHICS 58, 66 (2004) (arguing that rethinking the
global patent regime is essential to providing a third of the world’s population
access to essential drugs that they currently lack).
344. HOLLIS & POGGE, supra note 325, at 16.
345. See David Coles & Lynn J. Frewer, Stakeholder Views Regarding the
Objectives and Implementation of the HIF, in THE LIVING TREE, TRADITIONAL
MEDICINE AND PUBLIC HEALTH IN CHINA AND INDIA, supra note 35, at 51, 51; see
also Karan & Pogge, supra note 32, at 2 (noting that the HIF would have the
highest impact for products with a potential high global health impact but low
expected profit under the patent system).
346. See Karan & Pogge, supra note 32, at 3.
347. See HOLLIS & POGGE, supra note 325, at 8 (arguing that, even though in
the short term the HIP will primarily introduce new medicine for diseases that
primarily affect the poor, in the medium term it will attract “high impact medicines
for global diseases and conditions” that affect both the rich and the poor).
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Pay-for-performance schemes are increasingly becoming an
integral tool of national public health frameworks. Although there
are various studies indicating the positive impact such schemes have
in improving the accessibility and availability of medicines, the
reality is that one of the biggest challenges facing these schemes is
the fact that they remain somehow disconnected and absent from the
majority of national public health strategies.348
In general, actual measurement of these schemes would vary and
engulf a number of indicators depending on the type of the scheme in
question thus raising one of the major challenges facing these
schemes. Defining “performance” itself and tying payments to
absolute or relative levels provides another challenge. In addition,
which aspects of performance and targets should be use as indicators
and benchmarks of achieving the objectives? Indeed, as proclaimed,
“[r]ewarding performance first requires the ability to measure it.”349
There are a number of additional challenges which face PBRs and
HIP today. To start with, they require political support and long term
commitment from national authorities which is often lacking. On the
technical side of things, they require the existence of an accurate
assessment tool of impact of certain medicines on disease treatment
and improvement.350 The lack of institutionalization and adequate
legal regime of these schemes also adds another layer of difficulty
since these remain largely optional rather than compulsory.
The issue of perception also needs further clarity. Emerging
evidence is supportive of the view that these schemes often result in
positive outcome. A 2006 review by Petersen et al. found most
studies indicating partial or positive effects of performance for pay
financial incentives on quality measures.351 Some studies, however,
348. See James, supra note 321.
349. MARSHALL ET AL., supra note 328, at 11.
350. Currently, the standard measure of performance in health is the QALY in
which quality adjustments are based on studies of how individuals value different
health states. Specific QALY-based measurement tools include the EQ-5D, Paul
Dolan, Modeling Valuations for EuroQol Health States, 35 MED. CARE 1095
(1997), and the Health Utility Index, George W. Torrance et al., Multiattribute
Utility Function for a Comprehensive Health Status Classification System: Health
Utilities Index Mark 2, 34 MED. CARE 702 (1996), which have been used to help
determine the cost per QALY to make reimbursement decisions.
351. See Laura A. Petersen et al., Does Pay-for-Performance Improve the
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indicate that not all PBRs have had a positive impact.352 A 2012
study published by The New England Journal of Medicine353 found
that thirty-day mortality, or the rate at which people died within a
month after receiving certain procedures or care, was similar at the
start of the study between the two groups, and that the decline in
mortality over the next six years was also similar.354 “Moreover, they
found that even among the conditions that were explicitly linked to
incentives, like heart attacks and coronary artery bypass grafts, payfor-performance resulted in no improvements compared with
conditions without financial incentives.”355
Finally, lack of funding remains a huge challenge. It was estimated
for instance that HIP would need to mobilize $6 billion per year to
cater for its objectives.356 This includes the support for the
development of about two new drugs per year in addition to
sustaining a stock of about twenty medicines.357

X. THE WAY FORWARD
In the light of the above and in order to create and establish a
legally and ethically sound PBRs scheme, more research,
assessment, and examination is needed. More specifically, HIP needs
to create a new measurement tool which is suitable for various
countries and at the same time avoids the pitfalls of the current
regime.358
Quality of Health Care?, 145 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 265, 265 (2006);
Torrance et al., supra note 350.
352. See Carroll, supra note 329.
353. Ashish K. Jha, The Long-Term Effect of Premier Pay for Performance on
Patient Outcomes, 366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1606 (2012).
354. Id. at 1606, 1611.
355. Carroll, supra note 329.
356. See Bill Hinchberger, Pay for Performance to get Drugs to the Poor,
DEVEX (Nov. 17, 2014), https://www.devex.com/news/pay-for-performance-toget-drugs-to-the-poor-84812 (estimating that at that cost, the HIF could support
approximately twenty-five drugs).
357. HOLLIS & POGGE, supra note 325, at 4.
358. See Ladikas & Chaturvedi, supra note 35, at 43 (proposing adequate
funding is necessary to create a new measurement tool); see also UCLan Awarded
Two Million Euros to Improve Global Access to Medicines Through Pioneering
Research, U. CENT. LANCASHIRE (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.uclan.ac.uk/news/
UCLan_awarded_two_million_euros_to_improve_global_access_to_medicines_th
rough_pioneering_research.php (announcing that the University of Central
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The legal regime for initiatives like HIP and pay-for-performance
schemes should be reviewed in the light of these initiatives as it is
vital to position such schemes accordingly. More specifically, the
relationship between intellectual property and PBRs is also under
scrutiny. Intellectual property protection’s main focus is the
protection of property rights while PBRs’ main concern is public
health and access to medicines.359
Despite the above, the inherent deficiencies of the intellectual
property regime in this area need addressing to bring it in line with
such schemes. Although the TRIPS Agreement sets minimum
standards for patent protection for all member states, it neglects the
fact that patent protection for medicines is just one element of many
that contributes to setting the prices of medicines in any country
(procurement, taxes, production ability, and public health insurance
schemes are among other factors). By requiring such a monopoly
term under national law, however, it places the issue of patent
protection as one of the main determinants of the prices of medicines
thus neglecting other factors.360 Governments and individuals alike
will bear the costs, although the citizens of developing countries are
more likely to suffer more due to the lack of proper and adequate
public health coverage and insurance systems in these countries.361
So while reaching an understanding at the international level is
needed at some point,362 initiatives at the national and regional levels
should also be undertaken. In fact, some countries have already
started experimenting with some sort of regimes/funds under their
Lancashire was awarded a 2 million euro grant to research performance-based
reward systems based upon measurable global health impact).
359. See Hinchberger, supra note 356.
360. See generally Bartels et al., supra note 94, at 70 (examining intellectual
property and trade policy as the main determinants of price, and therefore access,
of medicine); Sterckx, supra note 343, at 58 (analysing the effects of the WTO
TRIPS Agreement on global access to pharmaceuticals).
361. See, e.g., Sterckx, supra note 343, at 68 (arguing that developing countries
lack human and infrastructural capacities to develop health technologies and
pharmaceuticals because of underlying economic problems).
362. Paul Grootendorst et al., Patents and Other Incentives for Pharmaceutical
Innovation, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HEALTH ECONOMICS (forthcoming) (manuscript
at 18-19) (on file with University of Toronto) [hereinafter Grootendorst et al.,
Patents] (examining the debate on various proposed alternatives to the patent
regime under international law).
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intellectual property regimes. For instance, under the 2002 Egypt
Intellectual Property Law,363 a drug price fund is proposed to deal
with high process of medicines. Based on this, article 18 of the law
states:
A Drug Price Stability Fund, having a legal entity and reporting to the
Minister of Health and Population, shall be established to maintain
stability in the prices of drugs -other than export drugs -with a view to
achieve health development and to guarantee that drug prices are not
affected by incidental changes. The organisation and resources of the fund
shall be determined by a decree to be issued by the President of the
Republic. Such resources shall include contributions from donor states
and intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations, as agreed by
the State.364

The preceding discussion paves the way to identify the real
problem with today’s model for financing medicines. Based on this,
HIP and PBRs provide complementary tools which may assist in
filling the gap by seeking to “reimburse drug companies that provide
an innovative drug at its cost price, with a reward based on the drug’s
incremental performance in improving health outcomes.”365 This is
done by “measuring a drug’s health impact in comparison with preexisting treatments, with a reward payable based on the drug’s
incremental benefit.”366 More importantly, HIP would trigger the
incentive—the reward—for the development of drugs affecting the
poor where little R&D activities are undertaken. By doing so, the
HIP balances profits and accessibility. Developing countries may
find useful tools in such schemes.

XI. CONCLUSION
This article considered various developments related to the
international intellectual property regime impacting access to
medicines and public health. Developing countries should adapt a
proactive approach in interpreting intellectual property obligations
under their national law. Special attention is given to those
363. Law No. 82 of 2002 (Law on the Protection of Intellectual Property
Rights), 2 June 2002 (Egypt).
364. Id. art. 18.
365. GILBERT’S LLP, supra note 342, at 6
366. Id.
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developing countries committed due to various bilateral and regional
agreements to apply TRIPS-Plus rules the paper provides various
examples from both developed and developing countries where
countries managed to limit the impact of TRIPS-Plus rules on their
citizens.
The paper also calls upon countries to also look for supplementary
tools to the intellectual property regime which would assist them in
dealing with public health challenges.367 In accordance with this, the
paper places the discussion on pay-for-performance schemes as an
integral part of an overall national development and health policymaking which is main objective is the enhancement of innovation in
public health, accessibility, and availability of medicines.368
If the above objectives are to be achieved, then the starting point
would be to acknowledge that the current national and global models
of financing and promoting medicines innovations are not working
and that a new thinking should be adopted. Continuing with the
current models will only exasperate the problem rather than solving
it.

367. See generally Grootendorst et al., Patents, supra note 362, at 18
(discussing the proposal of a global R&D treaty).
368. Pope, supra note 323, at 70 (“We need to consider it as part of a set of
complementary and substitutable strategies to achieve payer objectives, such as
those discussed in this chapter.”).

